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The Temporal Dimension of Self-Defense: 








The adoption by the United States of a doctrine of pre-emptive or even preventive self-defense as part of its national security strategy and its partial reliance upon that doctrine to justify the recent war against Iraq has caused a great deal of controversy at both the diplomatic level and among international legal scholars relating to the permissibility of anticipatory or preventive self-defense in advance of an armed attack​[1]​. While much legal opinion seems to be in broad agreement that self-defense would be permissible in response to an immediate and manifest threat of an attack​[2]​, opinion diverges sharply on whether self-defense would be permissible in response to potential threats of an attack and more especially, on the question of whether the notion of an immediate threat needs to be reexamined in the light of changed circumstances, such as terrorist threats and the possible use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist organizations and so-called rogue regimes​[3]​. Other points of controversy include such questions as what constitutes an immediate threat of an armed attack, what is the proper interpretation of the relationship between Charter law and customary law relating to self-defense, and what is the proper and desirable relationship between the right of self-defense and the rest of the law governing the use of force? 
	This article will attempt to address these questions and provide a contribution to this topical debate through a combination of legal reasoning and an examination of State practice. The starting point in this analysis is that self-defense is a right grounded in both Charter and in customary law, which allows at least some degree of anticipatory action to counter the clear and manifest threat of an attack within the immediate, or at least the proximate future, within the confines of the well known and widely accepted criteria laid down in the Caroline incident of 1837 relating to necessity, immediacy and proportionality. 
	In this context, it is submitted that these criteria still provide a workable and acceptable framework for analysis, but are not a substitute for analysis itself. Those criteria must be applied in context, taking into account the credibility and urgency of a specific threat, the consequences of suffering the incipient or probable attack and the availability, or lack thereof, of feasible alternatives to the taking of action in self-defense. In short, the Caroline criteria must be applied in the light of other factual and legal considerations and were never meant to be, nor can they be seen in isolation as mere abstractions, without due regard for the relevant circumstances of each particular situation. To demonstrate this, it will be necessary to examine a number of examples from State practice in which varying degrees of anticipatory action in self-defense were applied. Consequently, much of this article will be devoted to an examination of the permissible limits to the exercise of anticipatory self-defense, taking into account the analytical framework provided by the Caroline criteria and the relevant circumstances of each particular case or scenario which is used.
	Following this examination of State practice in relation to the limits of anticipatory self-defense and the question of the relevance and functions of the Caroline criteria, an analysis will be conducted of the shortcomings in the National Security doctrine of the United States, in particular, of the challenge it poses to the contemporary jus ad bellum in attempting to redefine the notion of self-defense and its place and function within the contemporary legal regime concerning the use of force, including the U.N. collective security system.
	The last-named topic, the role of anticipatory self-defense in relation to the U.N. collective security system, will be given attention in the final paragraph of this essay and the question of anticipatory self-defense will be examined in context with the rest of the law governing the use of force, in particular the role of the Security Council as the primary arbiter in the realm of the maintenance of international peace and security.
	The term “immediacy” will primarily be used in relation to the notion of an immediate or imminent threat of attack within the context of anticipatory self-defense, although secondary consideration will be given to the term as one of the conditions for the exercise of self-defense in a more general sense.​[4]​
	To avoid possible confusion, some preliminary clarification of the terminology which will be employed and the limits of this article are necessary. The term “preemptive self-defense” will be used to denote the exercise of self-defense in relation to manifest threats of armed attack which are in the process of being launched or on the point of being launched. The term “preventive action” or “preventive self-defense” will be used to denote the exercise of self-defense in relation to threats of attack which are somewhat more remote in time, but are nevertheless manifest or at least reasonably probable under the circumstances prevailing at the time action is undertaken. 
	The term “anticipatory self-defense” or “anticipatory action” will be used to refer to both of these variants of self-defense. None of these terms are meant to refer to action undertaken in response to the mere possibility of an attack being launched at some indeterminate point in the future in response to a threat which has not yet manifested itself in any substantial sense. 
	This article will be rounded off by a number of conclusions, in which the temporal aspects of self-defense will be examined in relation to the rules and principles governing the use of force, in particular the respective roles of self-defense and the UN Collective Security System. 


2.	The Legal Basis of the Right of Self-Defense


2.1	Substance of the Right of Self-Defense and its Relationship to Article 2(4) and Chapter VII of the Charter

The starting point for any discussion of the substance of self-defense and its place within the contemporary jus ad bellum is the prohibition of the use of force contained in Article 2(4) of the Charter and in customary international law. The prohibition of the use of force has been the linchpin of the contemporary international legal system since the Charter came into force in 1945. Although it has been subjected to differing interpretations by legal scholars and has been violated on numerous occasions, it is nevertheless still without doubt an almost universally accepted fundamental rule of international law and relations which is widely recognized as having a jus cogens character​[5]​. Much of the controversy has centered on whether it was intended to prohibit all uses of force which are not explicitly treated as exceptions in the Charter, such as humanitarian intervention and national liberation struggles. Since those topics have no direct relevance to the question of the scope of the right of self-defense, they need not concern us here, beyond stating that legal opinion is in wide agreement that the only clearly recognized exceptions to the prohibition are those contained in the Charter itself; the maintenance of collective security by or through the mandate of the Security Council and the right of self-defense. Consequently, any use of force at the inter-State level which does not qualify as action by or on behalf of the Security Council in the maintenance of collective security or as a lawful exercise of the right of self-defense is prima facie illegal, although there may be extenuating circumstances in relation to cases of humanitarian intervention, or support for “national liberation” which must be taken into account in assessing what the legal consequences on such cases should be​[6]​.
	Nevertheless, there is a fundamental difference between a use of force which is prima facie illegal and one which can be plausibly based upon a recognized exception in the Charter and customary international law. This remains as true today as when the Charter was drafted and has been underscored in numerous UN resolutions, decisions of the International Court and academic writings.
	The right of self-defense is predicated upon the notion that every State has the “inherent” right to defend itself against an armed attack. As has been conclusively pointed out by numerous authors, Article 51 of the Charter was something of an afterthought, which did not figure in the original drafts of the Charter, but was only included at a relatively late stage in the traveaux leading to the adoption of the Charter at the behest of the Latin American States in order to guarantee the legal position of regional collective self-defense arrangements, such as the Act of Chapaltupec​[7]​. This collective variant on the right of self-defense allows for States to assist each other in response to an armed attack on the basis of either a pre-existing treaty providing for mutual assistance, or an ad-hoc request​[8]​.
	Since self-defense is an exception to the prohibition, some authors argue that it must be applied restrictively and in accordance with a strict interpretation of the text of Article 51​[9]​. This is an understandable position, since as a rule, legal doctrine prescribes that exceptions to a general rule should be applied restrictively​[10]​. However, this ignores both the drafting history of Article 51 and the fact that it was never intended to completely codify the law relating to the exercise of the right of self-defense. Instead, it was primarily intended to safeguard the right of mutual assistance provided for in regional self-defense agreements and delineate the relationship between the right of States to exercise self-defense and the system of collective security contained in Chapter VII of the Charter. This relationship is spelled out in detail in Article 51, while the substance of the right is no more than mentioned. No reference is made as to what constitutes an armed attack, when such an attack can be said to have begun, or any of the other conditions relating to the exercise of self-defense, such as necessity and proportionality.
	Consequently, the right of self-defense cannot be interpreted solely on the basis of Article 51 of the Charter. Where Article 51 is specific it will clearly prevail, as for instance in subjecting the exercise of self-defense to the requirement of an armed attack, or in providing for the Security Council as ultimate arbiter of the continued necessity of the exercise of self-defense. Moreover, Article 51 should not be seen in isolation from Article 2(4) of the Charter, and this applies to the right of self-defense in a more general sense. However, where Article 51 is incomplete; as in leaving open what constitutes an armed attack and when an attack can be said to have commenced; or silent, as in relation to the other requirements governing the exercise of self-defense, recourse must be had to customary law as a means of complementing the Charter lex scripta of self-defense. This applies both to pre-Charter customary law as well as post-Charter customary law relating to self-defense, unless it can be conclusively demonstrated that such custom has come into disuse or would be in conflict with the Charter.
	Furthermore, without clear evidence that an older customary rule has been replaced by a newer one, there is no reason to automatically assume the demise of pre-Charter customary law relating to self-defense as a matter of legal methodology of Charter interpretation​[11]​.
	Having established that self-defense is a right having a dual customary - Charter basis and that Article 51 was intended to embed that right into the Charter system of collective security in conjunction with the Charter prohibition of the use of armed force, it is time to turn to what this means in terms of the place of self-defense within that overall system.
	Since Article 2(4) of the Charter prohibits the use of force, it follows that self-defense is a right of States, acting individually or collectively, to respond to illegal uses of force, through the use of legally sanctioned force aimed at repelling the attacking party. As such, obviously only one “side” to a conflict can have the right of self-defense. There is clearly no such thing as self-defense against self-defense, or self-defense against action carried out on another legal basis, such as the maintenance of collective security by or through a mandate of the UN Security Council or regional organization​[12]​. Furthermore, since self-defense is an exception to the overall prohibition of inter-State force, it follows that it may in principle be conducted on the territory of the State(s) whence the attack originated, and in international sea and airspace in addition to the defending State’s own territory. The territory of neutral or non-belligerent States is inviolable, except when it is being used as a launching pad for attacks or as a base of operations which contributes to the attack​[13]​.
	Nothing in either Article 51 or in customary law says that attacks can only be carried out by States. Although the presumption at the time the Charter was drafted was that States were the logical candidates to carry out aggression and Article 2(4) is addressed to States, the right of self-defense is not restricted to attacks carried out by States​[14]​. Any act of force which can be deemed to constitute an armed attack can invoke the right of self-defense, irrespective of whether such an attack is carried out by official State organs, by a State acting indirectly through other agents, such as armed bands, militias, terrorist groups and so forth, or by a non-State entity which is capable of mounting an attack on its own. Nothing in either Article 51 or in customary law restricts the right of self-defense to responses against attacks which are carried out by official organs of another State. However, it is clear that only States can exercise the right of self-defense under international law. Other forms of self-defense, such as that of individuals against illegal assault, are subject to the rules governing self-defense under national law​[15]​.
	Article 51 is silent or at best only indicative of what constitutes an armed attack, or that any of the other criteria are for the exercise of self-defense, such as necessity and proportionality. This is one clear example of the complementarity between the customary and Charter law relating to self-defense. We will return to those criteria further on in this article, but it is important to point this complementarity out, even at the risk of some repetition, in view of the ongoing controversy and confusion regarding the relationship between the two sources containing the law of self-defense.
	Where Article 51 is not silent is on the relationship between the right of self-defense and the UN collective security system. It is clear, both from the text of this provision and the intentions of the framers of the Charter, that self-defense was intended to function as a more or less temporary adjunct to the power and authority of the Security Council to take action to maintain or restore international peace and security through the taking of effective collective measures to that end​[16]​.
	The collective security system as envisaged in the Charter provides the Security Council with broad discretion and extensive powers to take a variety of measures in response to threats to or breaches of international peace which are laid out in Chapter VII including the proactive use of force against an aggressor​[17]​. However, this does not take the place of the right of self-defense unless and until the Council determines to act. Until the Council takes the necessary measures to restore international peace and security, there can be no doubt that a State faced with an attack retains the full right to defend itself or to assist another State (or other States) which is (are) confronted with an attack on the basis of a request or other form of consent, within the limitations on exercise of the right of self-defense which are contained in customary law. Of course any action taken in self-defense must be reported to the Security Council and is subject to its scrutiny and ultimate sanction or disapproval, provided these are forthcoming.
	This is what Professor Dinstein has referred to as the “two-phases rule” governing the exercise of the right of self-defense​[18]​. Essentially the Council can do one of three things in relation to a State which has invoked the right of self-defense. The Council can decide to endorse the invocation and if it so determines, to take action to assist the State which has done so. In such a case, the Council’s action will complement the measures taken in self-defense, or even subsume the States self-defense measures into a broader collective effort to restore international peace and security. A simple endorsement is just that, while further reaching collective measures will function alongside the State’s action in self-defense, unless the Council determines otherwise. 
	The second option open to the Council is to censure the State’s invocation of self-defense as illegal or inappropriate under the circumstances. The Council can even disallow a State which has a right to invoke self-defense from continuing to exercise that right, provided it takes the measures necessary to restore peace and security, or the attacker ceases and desists from continuing with its attack and provides the necessary cooperation to assure the discontinuance of its attack. If neither of these is forthcoming, then the State which has been attacked will retain its right of self-defense. Security Council measures aimed at restoring international peace and security must have that effect before they have the legal consequence of depriving a State of its right of self-defense in the face of an attack​[19]​. 
	The third possibility is in fact the one which has occurred most often. That is that the Council does not choose to act, or is unable to act, beyond perhaps simply condemning the attack or noting the existence of a breach of the peace, because of the (threat of a) veto. This was the situation during most of the Council’s first forty-five years of existence. Even now, in the post-Cold War era, there are any numbers of reasons why the Council may fail to act in response to a threat to or breach of the peace, although that is less likely than previously. In the event the Council takes any action short of effective measures aimed at restoring international peace, or fails to take any action at all, any State which is faced with an armed attack will retain the right to exercise its right of self-defense, either individually or in conjunction with other States acting collectively. However, while it is up to the State which invokes self-defense to do so in the first instance, it is the Council which ultimately has the last word, provided it is prepared to back up its words with action if the situation calls for it. Any action taken in self-defense will be subject to the ultimate legal and political approval or condemnation of the Council; or failing that, the approval or disapproval by the international community in a more general sense​[20]​. This is what is meant by the “two phases rule”. It is this incorporation of self-defense into the system of the Council’s overall primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security which is the most important feature of Article 51 of the Charter, not any supposed or imagined intention to significantly alter the substance of that right through its partial codification into the Charter​[21]​. 

2.2	The Dual Treaty-Customary Basis of Self-Defense and the General Criteria for the Exercise of the Right

	In the preceding paragraph, we have determined that self-defense is a right grounded in both Charter and in customary law and examined its place within the overall Charter system regulating the use of force. In that context it was pointed out that the primary purpose underlying the inclusion of Article 51 in the Charter was to safeguard the right of mutual assistance provided for in regional self-defense treaties, and more especially, to incorporate self-defense into the Charter system regulating the use of force, rather than to set out the criteria governing its exercise. For an indication of the criteria and conditions governing the exercise of self-defense we must necessarily turn to customary law; both that which existed when the Charter was drawn up and that which has emerged since the Charter came into force.
	The text of Article 51 predicates the exercise of the right of self-defense upon the occurrence of an armed attack​[22]​. However, Article 51 gives us no indication as to what constitutes an armed attack, or still less, when such an attack can be said to have commenced or to have been completed. It is clear from an examination of the traveaux preparatoires leading to the adoption of Article 51 that relatively little attention was devoted to these questions, but rather to the safeguarding of the collective right of self-defense, which was seen somewhat as a district category of self-defense alongside individual self-defense​[23]​. There is no evidence that the drafters intended to alter the right of self-defense as it then existed in customary law, or to substitute Article 51 in its place​[24]​.
	Nevertheless, a school of interpretation has emerged which purports to limit the exercise of self-defense to a strict and literal interpretation of the text of Article 51​[25]​. The problem with this approach, aside from the fact that it ignores the drafting history of this provision, is that it relies on a text which is ambiguous and incomplete. It is impossible on the basis of a sole reliance on Article 51 to determine what is meant by the term “armed attack”, or to determine what is meant by the phrase “if an armed attack occurs”, much less to gain an indication of what the other conditions are relevant in governing the use of force in self-defense. 
	There can be little doubt that the right of self-defense has customarily included at least some degree of anticipatory action, using the well known Caroline incident as a framework for reference. This was certainly the case in 1945 when the Charter was drafted, as is evidenced by the decisions of the International Military Tribunals in Nuremberg and Tokyo, which relied upon that precedent in its decisions relating to the German invasion of Norway in 1940 and the Declaration of War by the Netherlands (East Indies) against Japan immediately subsequent to the attack on Pearl Harbor​[26]​. Without any evidence which would indicate that this has changed, there is no reason to assume that at least some degree of anticipatory self-defense no longer exists within customary international law. We will examine the scope of this anticipatory dimension subsequently in this article.
	As to the question of what constitutes an armed attack in a more general sense, we have some indication on the basis of the Nicaragua judgment of the International Court of Justice​[27]​. In that decision, the Court relying heavily upon the General Assembly’s declaratory resolution known as the “Definition of Aggression” and the particular circumstances and available factual evidence relating to the Nicaragua case, determined that an armed attack consisted of a significant direct use of force by a State against another State, as well as the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, militias and the like to carry out armed actions against another State; provided such activities were comparable in their scale and effects to a conventional armed attack carried out by regular forces. In addition the possibility was admitted that the substantial involvement of a State in actions carried out by armed bands, irregulars and so forth, could constitute an armed attack under the same provision. Other forms of support which fell short of this threshold were deemed to never constitute an armed attack, irrespective of their effect upon the target State. 
	This rather restrictive rendition of the notion of an armed attack was heavily criticized at the time by a number of the judges in their dissenting opinions, as well as by numerous commentators​[28]​, including the present writer, as being unrealistic and failing to take into account that under different circumstances than those presented during the course of the proceedings in the Nicaragua case, other considerations could lead to different results. In addition, evidence which emerged later, concerning Nicaragua’s conduct, indicates that the Court may well have been mistaken in accepting Nicaragua’s rendition of the factual evidence at face value​[29]​.
	Be that as it may, there is no doubt that the Nicaragua decision, while authoritative, should not be seen as solving once and for all the question as to what forms of armed action and involvement and support for insurgencies, terrorist acts and the like, constitute an armed attack which would invoke the right of self-defense. Significantly, the Court refrained in that decision from pronouncing upon the question of anticipatory self-defense.
	More recently, in the Oil Platforms decision, the Court has set a high burden of proof on the State invoking the right of self-defense, without clearly indicating what the standard of proof is, and made a number of further rather ambiguous indications concerning what the threshold for an armed attack might be​[30]​. However, despite a somewhat deceptive numerical majority in the dispositief of that decision, a careful reading of the judgment and the individual opinions of the participating judges, indicates a heavily divided Court on both the interpretation of many of the issues relating to self-defense in that case, as well as the propriety of even pronouncing upon them within the context of that case, in the first place. These are considerations which should be taken into account in treating this decision as an authoritative precedent on the question of self-defense​[31]​.
	What does become clear, however, is that an armed attack, however defined, is a strict requirement for the exercise of self-defense. It is submitted that the Court’s approach in Nicaragua and Oil Platforms is overly abstract, unrealistic and somewhat imbalanced, in that it relies too heavily on theoretical definitions of what constitutes an armed attack, rather than taking sufficient account of the relevant circumstances and is prone to take denials of involvement in armed action by the (alleged) attacker too much at face value, while expecting the State which invokes self-defense to provide conclusive evidence not only in relation to its own conduct, lack of alternatives and motives, but those of the attacking party’s as well. 
	In addition to the requirement of an armed attack, or in the case of anticipatory self-defense the existence of a (probable) impending attack, there is little controversy regarding the existence of the requirements of necessity and proportionality. These requirements have long been accepted in customary law and are echoed in both of the abovementioned Court decisions relating to self-defense, although one finds little indication of what these requirements mean in practice in either one of them​[32]​.
	This is not necessarily as problematic as it might sound, since both criteria obviously have to be applied in relation to the relevant circumstances. Nevertheless, some indication of what these criteria mean in a general sense is unavoidable, leaving discussion of their application to anticipatory self-defense, and of the notion of immediacy to a subsequent point in this article.
	Necessity relates to the existence of an ongoing armed attack or the existence of a credible threat of an impending armed attack or the clear probability of a (renewed) attack, as well as to the existence of feasible alternatives to the taking of armed action in self-defense​[33]​. The existence of an armed attack can consist, in addition to the actual use of force, of the illegal ongoing occupation of territory, military preparations for continuing operations and so forth. Feasible alternatives can include the acceptance of a ceasefire, the negotiated withdrawal of forces, the discontinuance of hostile activity, and the like. They would also include the adoption and implementation of effective collective measures by the Security Council, or in some cases the possibility of forestalling an incipient or impending attack by the use of alternative means, such as law enforcement.
	Proportionality in connection with the exercise of self-defense relates both to the overall scale and effect of the attack, as well as what is required under the circumstances to repel the attack and put an end to the threat of further attacks. If an attack is simply an isolated incident, restricted in both scale and locale, as well as in time, the action in self-defense will correspondingly be limited to what is necessary to ward off the attack. If, however, an armed attack consists of a series of related incidents over a period of time, proportionality would allow for a larger scale response aimed at putting an end to what is in effect a phased attack. In the case of a large scale attack aimed at totally or significantly disrupting the target State, or taking over (part of) its territory, proportionality would allow for the waging of a full scale war in self-defense aimed at reducing or eliminating the attacking party’s capacity to conduct military operations, or otherwise continue with its attack. This could necessitate in some cases, the total defeat of an attacking State’s and the replacement of its government with one which is ready and able to meet its international obligations.
	The essential feature of self-defense is that it is aimed at ending the illegal situation posed in the form of an armed attack. It is the right of a State to use the necessary counter-force to achieve that end. No more than is necessary and no less than is required under the circumstances. This is what defines it and distinguishes it from other forms of the use of force, both those which are legal and those which are not. This has always been its essential characteristic under customary law, and still is today.


2.3	The Caroline case as the Starting Point and Dividing Line in the Discussion Relating to the Temporal Dimension of Self-Defense

	While there are some international lawyers who, relying on a literal textual interpretation of Article 51, reject the possibility of any form of anticipatory self-defense altogether; most authorities and for that matter most States are prepared to concede the possibility of at least some degree of anticipatory action within what are frequently referred to as the “strict criteria” of the Caroline case​[34]​. The Caroline incident (a more accurate term, since it never came before any court or tribunal) is generally regarded as the reference point for any discussion of the question of anticipatory self-defense, as well as of the criteria governing the use of force in self-defense in a more general sense. The incident has been commented upon so frequently that it is hardly necessary to go into great detail describing again what occurred​[35]​. The correspondence between Secretary of State Webster and the law officer of the British Crown, Lord Ashburton, and the British diplomatic representative to the United States, Mr. Fox, is primarily relevant for two reasons. 
	Firstly, it laid out the general criteria and framework of analysis for the exercise of self-defense, which included anticipatory self-defense in pre-Charter customary law. The acceptance by both the British and American governments that self-defense was relevant in situations where the necessity to act in anticipation of a threatened (incipient or probable) armed attack was “instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation” is a clear indication that anticipatory self-defense was an accepted part of traditional customary law​[36]​.
	Secondly, the reference to this general framework for analysis and these criteria by both the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals are clear indication that they were still considered to be part of the customary law referring to self-defense at roughly the same time the Charter was being drafted and enacted​[37]​.
	Since most authorities accept this as a given and there is no convincing evidence that the Caroline framework of reference or criteria governing the use of force in anticipation of an armed attack have fallen into disuse or have been replaced by a new rule of customary law or conventional law (since it is hopefully clear that the Article 51 of the Charter was never intended to have this effect), we can safely assume that “Caroline” still forms part of the customary law relating to self-defense.
	However, the Caroline framework and criteria have come up for extensive reinterpretation and rejection on a number of other grounds, especially in the light of recent events. On the one hand, there is a group of authors who have consistently rejected any form of anticipatory self-defense, notwithstanding its recognition as part of the customary law relating to self-defense at the time the Charter was being drawn up​[38]​. There is another group of authors who, while acknowledging the Caroline criteria, take the position that it only would apply to incipient attacks or to attacks which have already been launched, but have yet to reach their point of impact.​[39]​ On the other hand, there is a group of authors who accept, albeit to different degrees, the proposition that Caroline allows for anticipatory action in the face of an immediate or at least a reasonably proximate threat of attack which has not yet been launched, but is very likely to be launched within the near future​[40]​. Finally, there is a group of authors who have emerged since the events of 11 September 2001 which argues that the concept of “immediacy” has to be reinterpreted in the light of new circumstances; such as the threat posed by terrorists and “rogue regimes”, which are suspected to be in possession of, or in pursuit of the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, to allow for anticipatory action in response to the hypothetical possibility that an attack may occur at some indeterminate point in the future. This is essentially the position taken by the U.S. Government in its national security strategy document of September 2002 and of those authors who have come out in support of it​[41]​.


	This admittedly somewhat oversimplified summary of the positions regarding the present relevance of the Caroline criteria in relation to anticipatory self-defense raises a number of questions and reveals some fundamental problems concerning the interpretation of such an incident and general statement of principles.
	The first of these is what Caroline actually says regarding the possibility of taking anticipatory action. Does Caroline actually limit the exercise of self-defense to situations in which an attack has actually commenced, but has yet to reach its target as the rejectionists of anticipatory self-defense argue? Was this the state of the law at the time the Caroline incident took place or in 1945 when it was applied by the International Military Tribunals in relation to acts which occurred in the Second World War? If so, when does an armed attack actually commence? If on the other hand Caroline does actually apply to threats of attacks, how immediate does the threat have to be? Would this include threats which are more remote in time than the immediate period prior to the actual launching of an attack? If so, how much more remote and does this include potential threats rather than actual threats, as the supporters of the current US national security strategy contend? If not, should immediacy be reinterpreted in the light of (supposedly) changed circumstances? 
	More fundamental perhaps is the question of how a precedent such as Caroline should be viewed in the first place. Were the words spoken by Secretary Webster in relation to the criteria for anticipatory self-defense meant to serve as guiding principles which need to be interpreted in the light of all relevant circumstances, or as a set of abstractions which froze the issue of anticipatory self-defense into the confines of the nineteenth century prose used by Webster to resolve a particular diplomatic incident? ​[42]​  
	In any case, it is submitted that an answer to these questions can only be found by looking at least somewhat more closely at actual practice regarding anticipatory self-defense, rather than simply treating Webster’s phraseology in the Caroline incident as a sort of mantra in support of one or the other particular interpretation of whether anticipatory self-defense exists or how far it may extend in accordance with one’s own personal preferences on the matter.
	In doing so, one must be aware that every approach has its own particular limitations and that interpretations of historical events, both those more distant and more recent, will inevitably vary. Nevertheless, at least some attempt should be made if the question of what constitutes customary law is to mean more than an exercise in pure scholasticism in treating a particular choice of words as determinative of the issue.




3.	The Temporal Dimension of the Right of Self-Defense I:
	The Status of Self-Defense in Customary Law


3.1	Introductory Remarks and Methodology Employed

 	We will now turn to an examination of anticipatory self-defense in State practice, covering the period from 1940 through the Third Gulf War of 2003. This period extending over some sixty years covers the immediate pre-Charter period, as well as the period since the Charter has come into force. The examples selected include a variety of situations in which anticipatory force was used. In each example, the relevant facts will be set out as briefly as possible and a number of questions will be examined; including the degree of immediacy involved in relation to the nature and credibility of the threatened or incipient attack; the availability of feasible alternatives to the taking of some form of anticipatory action and the probable consequences of failing to take action; as well as the consequences of the action actually taken, including the reaction of the international community. Where necessary, other relevant considerations will be given attention. After this examination of State practice has been conducted, a number of general considerations and conclusions will be discussed on the basis of these examples.


3.2	An Examination of the Exercise of Anticipatory Self-Defense in State Practice

3.2.1	The Neutralization of the French Fleet by the Royal Navy in 1940
	In the Spring of 1940, a disaster befell the Allies in Western Europe. The German Wehrmacht, employing a new concept of mobile warfare known as Blitzkrieg, succeeded in overrunning the Netherlands, capturing the powerful Belgian frontier fortress of Eben Emael, quickly ending Belgian resistance and beginning the encirclement of the main Allied forces, which were deployed in Northern France and Belgium within a matter of days. Within a matter of a few short weeks, the British Expeditionary Force and a sizeable number of French troops had been driven from the Continent, having managed to make a forced evacuation from Dunkirk, and the Maginot Line had been almost completely encircled. Paris fell on 14 June and the new French Government under Marshal Petain entered into an armistice on 22 June 1940​[43]​.
	Under the terms of the armistice, all of France except the Southern third, minus the Atlantic coast, came under German occupation. That portion of the country continued to function as a semi-independent rump State known as Unoccupied or Vichy France; so called because its seat of government was located in the sleepy spa town of Vichy. In addition to the unoccupied portion of Metropolitan France, the Vichy Government maintained control over the extensive French overseas empire and the powerful French fleet, with its principal bases located in the Mediterranean at Toulon and in French North Africa. In addition, a number of French warships were located in French overseas possessions further afield and in British or British controlled points. The armistice terms further stipulated that part of the French fleet would continue to be stationed in French overseas possessions to enable the Vichy Government to maintain its control over the French overseas empire, while the bulk would return to Unoccupied France and retain its autonomy under German and Italian inspection and overall supervision​[44]​.
	During the years preceding the outbreak of war, France had built up its fleet with the support of successive governments, under the guidance and leadership of Admiral Jean Darlan, to become the world’s fourth largest navy. The fleet included a number of newly designed and constructed battleships, which were among the fastest and most powerful warships afloat and had been specially built to counter the threat posed by the newest class of German “pocket battleships”. Some of the newly constructed French battleships were operational, while others were in the stages of final completion, but not yet ready for operational duty. In addition to these modern battleships, the French fleet included an aircraft carrier, a sizeable number of fast modern cruisers and a large submarine force. Aside from countering the threat posed by German surface raiders in cooperation with the Royal Navy, its principal task in the period between the outbreak of the war in 1939 and the conclusion of the armistice in June 1940 had been to maintain control over the Mediterranean and keep a watch on the large Italian Navy​[45]​.
	With the conclusion of the armistice and the occupation of French Channel and Atlantic ports, together with the entry of Italy into the war on Germany’s side, the entire strategic situation and balance of forces at sea, upon which Great Britain depended for its survival, had shifted dramatically to Britain’s disadvantage. Instead of being able to count on the French Navy as a powerful ally which would assist the Royal Navy in maintaining control of the vital sea lanes, the British were now confronted by the combined force of the German and Italian Navies and the prospect of the French fleet being controlled by a nominally independent but German dominated government at best, and potentially falling under direct German and Italian control at worst.
	In the period immediately preceding the armistice, Prime Minister Churchill had personally sought the assurance of Admiral Darlan that he would not allow the French fleet to fall into the hands of the Germans. Churchill had urged Darlan to take the fleet out of reach of the Axis powers by sending its most powerful warships to French overseas possessions in the Western Hemisphere; a request which Darlan initially seems to have considered seriously, but ultimately decided against once the Armistice Agreement with Germany was concluded and he was given the important Ministry of the Marine, in charge of both the fleet and most of the overseas colonies in the Vichy Government​[46]​. One of the prime considerations behind Hitler’s decision not to occupy all of France and allow the French to maintain control over their overseas empire and fleet was to prevent the French Government from withdrawing from Metropolitan France and continuing to fight alongside Great Britain from its overseas bases, as well as an economical way to keep the French fleet and overseas empire out of British hands and under German’s influence and supervision, if not outright control​[47]​. 
	Although there is no evidence of concrete plans on the part of the Germans to try to take over direct control of the French fleet at the time, this possibility was uppermost in Churchill’s mind from the moment the Armistice Agreement between France and Nazi Germany was concluded, and Admiral Darlan had agreed to its terms, which would have brought most of the fleet back to Metropolitan France under German and Italian supervision and within striking distance of the Germans. Prime Minister Churchill was under no illusion of the sacrosanctity of any agreement entered into by the Nazi leadership and was not convinced of the willingness of the Vichy Government to vigorously resist a German attempt to seize the fleet, or its ability to do so even if it wanted to. The Germans had proved their ability to carry out daring and difficult strikes successfully and at lightning speed during their invasion of France and the Low Countries, and Churchill and his cabinet had little doubt of their ability to seize direct control of the French fleet, if they decided to do so. If this were to happen, it would have meant that Great Britain would not only have been forced to completely withdraw from the Mediterranean, but would have potentially been faced with the loss of overall naval superiority, which would have inevitably resulted in its defeat​[48]​.
	These considerations brought Churchill to what he described as the most painful decision he had to take during the entire course of the war; the neutralization, or if necessary the destruction, of the French fleet in its overseas bases and in British or British controlled ports before it could return to Metropolitan France out of reach of the Royal Navy under the terms of the armistice. While a significant part of the French Navy was already located in its home bases in France, the majority of its most powerful vessels was still either in French overseas bases, or in British or in British controlled ports immediately following the conclusion of the armistice. However, the window of opportunity was extremely narrow- and if the British were going to strike, they would have to strike quickly​[49]​.
	Churchill gave the order to carry out ‘Operation Catapult’ on 3-4 July 1940. This entailed the takeover of those French warships in British ports and the neutralization or, if necessary the destruction of the French warships located in British and French overseas bases. The first part of the plan went relatively smoothly. Within a matter of hours British sailors and marines succeeded in gaining control over the French naval vessels located in British ports with a minimal loss of life. The success of this part of the Operation only confirmed Churchill in his conviction of the necessity of the chosen course of action What the British could do, could also be accomplished by the Germans if they so chose​[50]​. The neutralization of the powerful French squadrons located in Alexandria and the French West Indies was also accomplished bloodlessly, with the local French commanders accepting the British ultimatum to accept the demobilization of their vessels under supervision in the face of overwhelming British naval superiority​[51]​.
	The rest of ‘Operation Catapult” took a different course. British Vice Admiral Somerville was dispatched from Gibraltar on 1 July 1940 with orders to deliver an ultimatum to French Admiral Gensoul commanding the main French strike force at Mers-el-Kebir, located close to the port of Oran in French North Africa. This base was where most of the most powerful vessels in the French Navy were located, including the modern battle cruisers the Dunkerque and Strasbourg. The ultimatum offered the French commander three alternatives: to join with the British and continue the fight against the Axis; to sail under British escort to either the French West Indies or to an American port and be demobilized; or to scuttle his vessels under British supervision. Failure to agree to one of these alternatives would force the British to open fire.
	The French commander was given until sunset on 3 July to consider the terms offered and in his communication with the Vichy Government, omitted mentioning the second of the alternatives offered, naming only the possibility of joining the Allies, or facing destruction. He received orders from Vichy to resist and try to escape, which he proceeded to carry out once the ultimatum expired. The British force opened fire and succeeded in destroying or heavily damaging the bulk of the French squadron, although the battleship Strasbourg succeeded in escaping with significant damage to Toulon, together with an escorting cruiser. The British action resulted in the death of some 1300 French sailors and 340 wounded, but succeeded in its main purpose of neutralizing the most important segment of the French fleet – albeit at a heavy cost in French lives. It should not be forgotten that the French and British had been allies until a few short weeks before this action, and that however necessary the action was from the British standpoint, it was one which they did not take without great reluctance. Needless to say, the entire operation, especially the destruction of the French strike force at Mers-el-Kebir, was viewed in a different light by most French at the time. Some members of the Vichy Government saw it as grounds for declaring war against Great Britain, although more prudent counsel prevailed​[52]​. Vichy was in no position to wage war and would have lost whatever bargaining position it had, if it had entered the war in what would in effect have been the role of a minor German ally.
	What about the broader repercussions of the British action in neutralizing and partially destroying the French fleet? The action certainly had the effect of cementing the will of both the British public and political elite to continue resistance against the seemingly overwhelming power of the Axis; “alone if need be” in the words of Churchill. The Prime Minister’s announcement of the operation in the House of Commons received a tumultuous response, and Great Britain faced the prospect of siege, possible invasion, and the opening of the ‘Battle of Britain’ with renewed confidence​[53]​ Spain and Portugal were given a strong inducement to remain neutral, despite the pro-Fascist leanings of their governments. Even members of the Fascist Italian Government, such as Count Ciano, Mussolini’s son in law and Italy’s Foreign Minister, were privately impressed by Britain’s show of resolve and demonstrated capacity to act, even if this had little overall impact upon Italian conduct in the war​[54]​. Most importantly, the United States Government was both relieved at the removal of a potential threat to its own security and favorably impressed with the success of the operation. President Roosevelt’s policy, which favored providing material assistance to Great Britain, short of actually entering the war, was strengthened as a result of this British action and show of resolve. This went some way in assisting him against those who felt such assistance would be wasted effort​[55]​.     
	Most noteworthy for our discussion, is that no major non-belligerent nation other than Vichy France, condemned the action as either unnecessary or illegal. From a strictly legal perspective, Great Britain had struck a major blow against a government with which it was not at war, and which until recently had been its ally. France was within its legal rights to seek an armistice under the best terms it could obtain. The terms of the Armistice Agreement did not provide for a surrender of the French fleet to German and Italian control, which would have made it a lawful target under the laws of war. There were no concrete indications at the time, nor has any evidence emerged since, that the Germans had any immediate plans to try and seize direct control of the French fleet​[56]​, although that was an option they could consider at any time they chose to do so. Still, this was in legal terms, a case of preventive, or if at best preemptive, self-defense at the time the British decided to act. There was certainly no question of intercepting a German move to seize the French fleet, much less of an attack by that fleet on Great Britain itself, nor of any other legal ground other than (anticipatory) self-defense, which would justify the British action against a defeated non-belligerent State like Vichy France.
	This brings us to the question of the legality of the British action in terms of anticipatory self-defense. Despite the lack of concrete evidence of a German invention to try to seize control of the French fleet, there can be little doubt that the threat to Great Britain’s security which was posed even by that possibility was immediate. Once the fleet had returned to Metropolitan France and come under German and Italian supervision, it would have been virtually impossible for the Royal Navy to have reached it, or in the event it had been attempted in the face of overwhelming odds, the chances of success without the risk of prohibitive losses in both men and material would have been virtually negligible. As stated earlier, the window of opportunity to carry out this operation, with the greatest chance of success and least prospect of unnecessary loss of lives, was extremely narrow. Hence, under the specific conditions prevailing at the time, the potential threat of the French fleet coming under German control was immediate enough to justify anticipatory action in self-defense. 
	There were likewise no feasible alternatives to the course of action Churchill and his Government chose to take. The alternatives offered the French commanders were honorable, reasonable and in fact the only options the British could offer under the circumstances. If the French fleet were to have come under German control, it would have been too late, even if that only happened months later. The threat posed by that possibility can only be described as overwhelming, since it would have almost inevitably meant defeat, especially in the first year following the fall of France.
	These factual considerations applied in context with the Caroline criteria, together with the acceptance of the British action as necessary and lawful at the time, point clearly and overwhelmingly to the conclusion that the British action in neutralizing the French fleet was a lawful exercise of anticipatory self-defense. It is also a clear indication that anticipatory self-defense was accepted as lawful in principle under the customary law existing only a few years before the Charter was adopted. There is no indication that the law underwent any significant change in this respect prior to the adoption of the Charter.

3.2.2	The Six Day War of 1967
	In the late Spring of 1967, tensions mounted steadily in the Middle East and events moved inexorably in the direction of renewed war between Israel and its Arab neighbors. These included the closing of the Straits of Tiran to all maritime traffic bound for the Israeli port of Eilat (the Suez Canal had long been closed to traffic bound to or from Israel), the expulsion by Egypt of the UN peacekeeping force (UNEFII), which was stationed in the Sinai Peninsula along the Israeli-Egyptian border and the formation of a joint command between Egypt and Syria. These events were accompanied by speeches in which President Nasser of Egypt expressed his determination to end the presence of the Israeli State once and for all, and even “to drive the Jews into the sea”, as well as an upsurge in fedayeen attacks from across the Sinai border into Egypt and the deployment of Egyptian troops into forward positions along that border, which had been vacated by the departing UNEF troops​[57]​.
	Diplomatic efforts by Israel in the United Nations and elsewhere to at least partially restore the status quo ante were unsuccessful. The UN Secretary General took the position that he had no choice but to accede to the Egyptian Government’s demand that UNEF be withdrawn, since it was dependent upon Egyptian consent to carry out its functions. There was obviously no question of the Security Council coming to a decision which would have provided a mandate for UNEF to carry on without Egyptian consent under the political conditions prevailing at the time. The Security Council mirrored then, as it does at any time, the prevailing political strategic and diplomatic situation which exists in any given period.
	At the time in question, this situation was characterized by the Cold War divisions which dominated all international relations. Other initiatives aimed at the formation of a multinational naval force to restore and maintain Israel’s maritime communications through the Straits of Tiran also foundered as a result of these political divisions and the perceived possibility that a regional crisis might develop into a broader East-West confrontation.
	The situation became even graver when Jordan announced its support for Egypt and Syria and entered into a military alliance with those two States. This meant that Israel was now surrounded by potential adversaries, who together possessed an overwhelming numerical superiority in military terms on the ground in the numbers of available combat troops, tanks, armored vehicles and artillery, including surface – surface missiles capable of striking at Israeli population centers. This was now compounded by a precarious geographical position; at one point the Israeli-Jordanian border along the West Bank extended to only twelve miles from Israel’s Mediterranean coastline, opening the possibility that the country could be cut in two, if the Jordanian Army succeeded in driving a wedge between Israel’s Northern and Southern halves​[58]​.
	Although this unfavorable geographical situation and numerical inferiority were somewhat compensated by the qualitative superiority of the Israeli Air Force, Israel was confronted with a large Egyptian Air Force which was equipped with a sizeable number of modern Russian built combat aircraft. If Israel was going to ensure a successful defense, and probably its very survival as a State against what appeared to be an increasingly likely attack within the near future; its best option was to try to take out the Egyptian Air Force on the ground before any offensive was mounted. Once an attack was underway, it would be much more difficult to avoid large scale casualties among its own civilian population in view of the proximity of its major population centers to the borders of its adversaries and its overall lack of strategic depth.
	If Israel were to succeed in gaining air superiority by successfully destroying a large portion of the Egyptian Air Force before it could attack or disperse, it would have a good chance of defeating its adversaries in detail​[59]​.
	These considerations led Israel to strike pre-emptively in anticipatory self-defense. On the early morning of 5 June, its air force, flying low to avoid Egyptian radar, succeeded in carrying out the destruction of the bulk of Egypt’s modern combat aircraft and air defenses on the ground within a matter of hours. Having established air superiority, the Israeli armed forces were able to drive through the Egyptian positions in the Sinai and reach the Suez Canal, while simultaneously successfully taking the initiative on the Jordanian and Syrian fronts. After several UN Security Council resolutions which called on the parties to accept a cease-fire without apportioning blame on either side had been ignored, the parties to the conflict finally accepted a unanimous call by the Security Council for a cease-fire on the evening of 10 June 1967​[60]​.
	How was the Israeli pre-emptive strike viewed at the time and what were its immediate repercussions? The overwhelming majority of opinion was favorable and in support of the Israeli action as a reasonable and lawful exercise of anticipatory self-defense. Attempts to have the Israeli pre-emptive strike condemned in both the Security Council and the General Assembly, failed by large majorities​[61]​. It is significant that during the debates, reference was made to the Caroline criteria by a number of delegates, indicating that many States saw the Israeli action as a lawful exercise of anticipatory self-defense, rather than assuming that it may have had its legal basis on some other grounds, as has been submitted by a number of authorities since then; a question we will return to presently in this discussion.
	A further indication that the Israeli action was viewed as lawful at the time can be found in the terms of the well known Resolution 242, which was adopted by the Security Council on 22 November 1967, and is still widely seen as providing the framework for an overall settlement of the conflict. There is no mention of any condemnation of the Israeli action, nor even a reference to any illegality in Israel’s occupation of the territories it had gained control of as a result of the Six Day War. Instead, both parties were called upon to reach a lasting overall settlement on the basis of an acceptance of Israel’s right to security, in exchange for a return of (most of) the land it had occupied as a consequence of the war. This would seem to be an implicit acknowledgement of the legality of Israel’s action which takes into account the circumstances which led to it, which received the wide support of the international community. Had the general opinion regarding the Israeli action been different, it seems safe to say that this resolution would have worded differently and contained some stiffer language directed at Israel in view of the general tenure of General Assembly resolutions directed at Israel. Whatever one’s views are regarding the subsequent conduct of both parties, or regarding Israel’s policies in the occupied Territories, this should not lead to ex-post assessments of the Israeli recourse to anticipatory self-defense, or how the international community viewed it at the time.
	Turning to the application of the Caroline framework and criteria in the light of the relevant circumstances, the first question that has to be addressed is whether we are dealing with an example of anticipatory self-defense in the first place, or whether the Israeli action probably had another legal basis which would explain its general acceptance. The reason for this preliminary question is to be found in the opinions expressed by some authorities that the Israeli action could be seen as an exercise of belligerent rights in the context of an ongoing armed conflict against States with which Israel was in a technical state of war. Another possibility which has been put forward is that Israel responded to an actual attack which had already commenced, rather than an immediate threat of an attack, making its action one of 
”regular” self-defense, rather than one of anticipatory self-defense​[62]​.
	Both of these arguments are implausible at best and artificial and unconvincing at worst. To be sure, Israel had been in a technical state of war with its Arab neighbors (and still is with the exceptions of Egypt and Jordan which have both signed formal peace treaties in more recent years) since its inception in 1948. However, that does not change the fact that this technical state of war has been characterized by long periods in which no significant inter-State hostilities have taken place, interspersed with four short, intensive international armed conflicts carried out by the armed forces of the respective adversaries. To argue that any of the respective parties has the right to reopen hostilities at any moment of its choosing on the basis of the exercise of belligerent rights is to fly in the face of various armistice agreements, cease-fire orders and Security Council resolutions rejecting such claims, over a long period of years. Nor does the absence of a formal armistice or cease-fire agreement provide an automatic exception to this, if in fact a de-facto material armistice has been in effect for any significant period of time​[63]​.
	Likewise, the contention that Israel responded to an actual attack, rather than to the prospect of a probable attack in the near future, is to stretch the meaning of the term to the limit. To be sure, Israel’s neighbors were expressing hostile intent by engaging in preparations for an attack and destruction of Israel as a State - and possibly its people, but no attack had been launched at the moment Israel struck. 
	It is also true that by closing the Straits of Tiran to Israeli maritime commerce, Egypt had initiated a partial blockade, or rather intensified an existing blockade, since the land borders between Israel and its Arab neighbors, as well as the Suez Canal, had long been closed to any commerce or traffic bound to or from Israel. However, Israel’s air and sea communications through the Mediterranean were still unaffected, and Israel was neither facing strangulation nor economic ruin as a result from Egypt’s act. While a blockade can sometimes be tantamount to an armed attack, it is also true that not just any blockade, particularly one of a partial nature such as the one in effect used against Israel since the Straits had been closed, could be so considered. There have been many examples of partial blockades or the closing of frontiers to States in the period since 1945 which have not been seen as constituting armed attacks, and there was no reason to treat this one as a special case which would have constituted an armed attack on its own. If Egypt had attempted to cut Israel’s sea and air communications completely, this would have been different; but no such action had occurred at the time Israel decided to take pre-emptive action​[64]​.
	Taking the above considerations into account, the most reasonable conclusion is that while there were clear indications of a probable impending attack, no armed attack had yet been launched, or even put into motion at the time Israel decided to take anticipatory action by destroying Egypt’s offensive capability. The upsurge in fedayeen incursions from across the Egyptian border would have justified a proportionate response designed to neutralize this threat, not a full scale war.
	Hence, Israel’s pre-emptive strike is an almost textbook example of the exercise of anticipatory self-defense in the face of an immediate threat of an armed attack, rather than one of response to an actual attack, or even interception of an attack which had already been launched, but had not yet reached its target; a conclusion which is shared by the majority of authorities​[65]​.
	If Israel’s action was one of anticipatory self-defense, the next question is how it measured up in relation to the Caroline framework of assessment and criteria for the taking of such action. The answer to this is that Israel’s action is an example of a reasonable and justified recourse to anticipatory self-defense under the circumstances. That the threat was immediate would seem to hardly require further explanation. Egypt, Jordan and Syria had taken a number of steps which clearly pointed to their likely intention and capability to launch an attack – perhaps within a few days – perhaps even sooner or slightly later; but nevertheless within the immediate future. Whether or not they would have actually struck, rather than just engaging in a dangerous game of bluff and hostile rhetoric is irrelevant. By initiating an acute crisis situation and engaging in preparations for an attack they created a situation of immediate threat which justified the Israeli response. No State can reasonably be expected to take the risk that adversaries which have pronounced their intention to wage a war of annihilation and have taken their preparations to do so, are merely engaging in a game of bluff and intimidation. 
	Likewise, the threat they posed was certainly credible. The formation of a joint command, the movement of troops into forward positions, their numerical superiority and the probability of high civilian casualties if they did strike first, due to Israel’s geographical situation and other factors enumerated above, combined to pose a threat which was both credible and overwhelming. 
	It is also clear that Israel had no feasible alternatives to the taking of anticipatory military action. Once its diplomatic efforts had failed, it could expect no effective effort by the UN or anyone else that would have restored the situation.  If it restricted its response to the taking of preparations on its own territory, it would not be ensured of avoiding disaster. Once an attack was launched, it would be at a serious disadvantage due to its lack of strategic depth and forced to accept the prospect of its cities becoming a battleground. In short, its options were almost non-existent.
	Finally, its action was proportionate in relation to the threat it faced. The Israeli armed forces decisively defeated and drove back its adversaries to positions which ensured its security against renewed attack and provided it with a favorable bargaining position in any subsequent negotiations. That this has not resulted in a lasting peace settlement, due to a host of factors which go beyond the scope of assessment of the Caroline framework or this article, does not change this in the least. In short, the Israeli pre-emptive strike of June 1967 was a clear example of justified anticipatory self-defense.

3.2.3	The 1981 Israeli Strike against the Osirak Nuclear Reactor
	In June 1981, the Israeli Air Force carried out a successful surgical strike against an Iraqi nuclear reactor, located at Osirak near Baghdad. The reactor had been purchased from France in 1975 and was not yet operational at the time the strike was carried out. Although under the terms of the purchase agreement between France and Iraq, the Osirak facility was subject to IAEA inspection in accordance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1963, Israel had reason to believe that Iraq would not observe the terms of that agreement and was in fact engaged in a program aimed at the production of weapons grade nuclear material.
	Although Israel had protested the sale of a nuclear reactor to Iraq, and had attempted to dissuade France from going through with the agreement and made its concerns known in various diplomatic fora, its efforts to prevent the delivery of nuclear technology to Iraq had been unsuccessful. Israel understandably regarded Iraq as an implacable hostile State which would pose a grave threat to its security and possibly even its survival, if it were to acquire nuclear weapons. At the time, Iraq’s military potential was already formidable and was growing rapidly. Moreover, though its may seem strange today, it is worth remembering that Iraq enjoyed a very favorable diplomatic position at that time, which made the prospect of Israel successfully enlisting effective Security Council support for the containment of Iraq’s inspected nuclear weapons program and regional power ambitions remote​[66]​.
	The United States viewed Iraq as a bulwark against Iranian revolutionary religious extremism at that time, while France had intensive commercial and diplomatic ties with the Iraqi Government and the Soviet Union had long been a traditional ally of Iraq. Finally, Israel almost certainly must have taken into consideration that a successful strike against the Osirak nuclear facility would have become infinitely more difficult, once the reactor became operational. From its point of view, it would have to prevent Iraq gaining access to nuclear weapons technology by any means necessary, even at the cost of diplomatic isolation and legal condemnation in view of the prevailing diplomatic situation. It chose to act at what seemed to be the most favorable moment from a military - strategic point of view before the possibility to act had been narrowed down or even eliminated completely​[67]​.
	In the event, Israel’s action was roundly condemned by the Security Council and by the international community at large. Israel’s invocation of its right to exercise anticipatory self-defense in the Council was unanimously rejected by the Council. It is, however, significant that in doing so, many delegates did not reject the concept of anticipatory self-defense per se, but rather Israel’s reliance on it under the concrete circumstances. Israel’s reliance upon anticipatory self-defense was rejected by a number of delegates specifically, and probably implicitly by a majority in the Council as a whole, as not meeting the Caroline criteria of immediacy and lack of feasible alternatives. This can be seen as at least conditional support for the concept of anticipatory self-defense by a wide segment of the international community, provided the conditions laid down in the Caroline framework for assessment of anticipatory self-defense action have been plausibly met​[68]​. At the time, it was clearly the view of the international community that Israel had failed to meet this test​[69]​. Although many have subsequently modified their opinion in the light of subsequent events, it remains an incontrovertible fact that the Israeli strike against the Osirak nuclear facility was deemed illegal at the time.
	This brings us to the question whether in fact the Israeli action was justifiable, either at the time or in retrospect, as a lawful exercise of anticipatory self-defense on the basis of the Caroline framework and criteria. Even if one takes into account the difficult dilemma which Israel faced; the prospect of a hostile neighboring State gaining access to nuclear technology combined with a remote chance of preventing this through diplomacy within the immediate future, it is hard to see how Israel’s strike can be judged to have been lawful. 
	There was no evidence of an Iraqi intention to attack Israel in the foreseeable future at the time. There was not even conclusive evidence that Iraq was engaged in, much less on the point of developing a nuclear weapons capability when the Israeli action was carried out. The fact that we now know more about Iraq’s ambitions to obtain nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and about the nature of the erstwhile Iraqi regime does not change this, although it does make Israel’s action more acceptable in historical terms. Nevertheless, as has been pointed out, much of what we know about Iraqi ambitions and propensity to engage in “antisocial behavior”, such as invading its neighbors and massacring its citizens with chemical weapons, had yet to be revealed. Neither the Israeli Government, nor anyone else, could foresee in 1981 what has occurred since then. Ex-post assessments of the threat posed by Iraq and the nature of its government, which are largely based on hindsight, do not substitute for evaluations of the necessity of Israel’s action at the time, although as stated they may well make some difference in historical terms. In any case, in assessing the legality of the Israeli action, the circumstances which were known at the time must prevail over historical hindsight. Any other alternative would make it virtually impossible to assess the legality of any use of force, anticipatory or otherwise. On the other hand, it is reasonable to take subsequent events into account to the extent that they point to good reasons to mitigate the unlawfulness of an act which was rightly determined to be illegal at the time. 
	It is submitted that this should be the outcome of an overall assessment of Israeli’s strike against the Osirak nuclear facility for a number of reasons. Firstly, the facts based on what Israel knew and did at the time the strike was carried out. Israel knew that Iraq was an implacably hostile adversary and had little reason to believe that its purchase of a nuclear reactor was because it was economically necessary, in view of its vast petroleum reserves, or that it would not probably attempt to produce nuclear weapons at the first opportunity which presented itself. The strike was carried out surgically and proportionally, directed solely at eliminating the potential threat posed by the reactor. Moreover, Israel had little prospect of gaining diplomatic support in the Security Council or elsewhere for an initiative aimed at preventing Iraq gaining access to nuclear technology based on the diplomatic standing of Iraq within any foreseeable period of time.
	While these factors go a considerable way towards making Israel’s action understandable, they did not make it legal at the time, nor do they make it legal now in the light of what we have subsequently learned. Israel was not faced with threat, of attack by a nuclear armed Iraq within the short or medium term future. Consequently, Israel’s action was rightly and understandably judged to be unlawful at the time. Israel did not, nor could it produce clear evidence of more than the most potential of threats to its security. To the rest of the international community, Israel’s action appeared to be precipitate and unnecessary based on what was known then. Even if the Caroline criteria and framework for assessment may provide for the possibility of anticipatory action against potential threats under special circumstances, such as those which Britain faced in 1940 in relation to the very distinct possibility that Germany could gain control over the French fleet, they cannot be stretched to the point that they would justify the taking of preventive action against the mere possibility that a State might obtain a nuclear weapon and might be in a position to use it at some completely indeterminate point of time in the future.
	On the other hand, Iraq’s subsequent conduct and ensuing events since 1981 should not be ignored either. If the international community would have known or even seriously suspected what has come to light since then, it is highly unlikely that Israel’s action would have been condemned, certainly not as universally as was the case at the time. This goes a considerable way towards mitigating the illegality of Israel’s action. In the present author’s view, Israel’s action was illegal, but understandable and ultimately partly justifiable in historical terms.

3.2.4	The Gulf War of 2003
	The most recent Gulf War conducted by the United States and the United Kingdom against the regime of Saddam Hussein with the object of removing him and his close associates from power and enforcing compliance with UN Security Council resolutions relating to Iraq’s partial disarmament remains highly controversial, and has already been widely commented upon in international legal literature. A number of possible legal justifications have been advanced for the invasion and overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s government. These include as the primary legal justification the question of the legal basis provided by Security Council resolutions 678, 687 and 1441 for the use of force against Iraq and the failure of Iraq to fully cooperate with the Council’s efforts to ensure its disarmament over a period of more than a decade.
	Another possible legal justification put forward is that the United States and United Kingdom had the right to reopen hostilities against Iraq on the basis of the law governing armistices and cease-fires, contained in the 1907 Hague Convention on Land Warfare and related customary law. This line of reasoning views the recent conflict as a continuation of the earlier conflict of 1991 on the basis of a breach of the armistice / cease-fire terms by Iraq, which would enable the other principal belligerents (the US and the UK) to reopen hostilities. This line of argument is related to, but is distinct from the one which says that existing Security Council resolutions provide a legal basis for military action against Iraq, in that it relies on a separate legal basis, the law governing armistices and cease-fires, rather than the resolutions themselves as a justification for military action​[70]​.
	There are reasonable arguments both for and against these two possible justifications. However, none of these are directly related to the concept of self-defense - anticipatory or otherwise – or to the topic of this article. Consequently, they will receive no direct attention beyond stating that on balance, neither of these lines or reasoning appear to this author to provide a convincing legal basis for the invasion and subsequent military occupation of Iraq, even though they are not wholly devoid of merit​[71]​.
	Additional arguments not related to self-defense, such as the undoubted oppressive nature of the Iraqi regime and its long record of serious human rights violations, or the desirability of removing a government which has proven to be an obstacle to peace and stability in the region, will likewise not receive any direct attention, beyond stating that these are generally seen as even less persuasive in terms of providing a legal justification for the recent military action against Iraq, whatever their political or moral merits might be​[72]​.
	However, there is a line of reasoning which has been put forward in justification of the recent war which is related to the topic of anticipatory self-defense, namely the threat posed by the alleged actual or potential link between Saddam Hussein’s government and international terrorism and the possibility that Iraq could have provided support to Al Qaeda in obtaining weapons of mass destruction which could have been used in an attack on the United States or its allies. We will turn to that now, leaving discussion of the broader implications of what is sometimes referred to as the “Bush Doctrine” of pre-emptive self-defense to a subsequent portion of this article.
	In relation to the facts that were known at the time the US initiated military action against Iraq in the Spring of 2003, or which have emerged in the period since then, the matter is straightforward.  There were no indications, beyond mere allegations, that Saddam Hussein’s Iraq had any kind of significant links to Al Qaeda or similar terrorist organizations, or was in any way associated with the attack of 11 September 2001 on New York and Washington. Neither the evidence presented the Security Council in the weeks preceding the invasion, nor any evidence which has emerged since has provided anything even remotely indicating the existence of a relationship between the Iraqi Government and the Al Qaeda organization or the events of 11 September 2001. Nor have any indications emerged that Saddam Hussein’s Iraq was in the process of establishing or even contemplating establishing any such link with Al Qaeda or similar movements. In the absence of credible indication that Iraq was associated with the attack of 11 September 2001, much less was even contemplating an attack on its own on the United States or anyone else within the foreseeable future, the conclusion regarding the legality of action in anticipatory self-defense against Iraq is overwhelmingly that it could not be justified on that basis​[73]​.
	

3.3	Some Preliminary Conclusions Regarding the State Practice in Relation to 			Anticipatory Self-Defense

	In the preceding paragraph, we have examined a number of situations stretching over a period of some sixty years in which a claim of anticipatory self-defense played a central or prominent role in the justification of the use of force. While there were other possible examples which could have been used, those which were chosen were considered to be the most illustrative of the scope of the right to take anticipatory action, as well as of the limitations to that right. They also provide a key to understanding how the Caroline criteria actually work in practice; not as a static checklist, or as a verbal straitjacket which must be taken literally, but as a set of guiding principles which provide a framework for assessment of anticipatory action in self-defense which is applied in the light of the relevant circumstances, based upon the information which is available at the time.
	This becomes clear if one looks at how these incidents relate to Secretary Webster’s well known formula “a necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment of deliberation”. This formula has often been understood to apply exclusively to situations in which there is a virtual certainty that an attack has actually been initiated, but has yet to reach its point of impact, or at most is on the point of being launched within the very immediate future in a literal sense. A question of minutes or hours rather than days, or weeks, much less any longer period, irrespective of any other considerations. However, this is not the way Caroline has been applied in practice. To further illustrate this we must take a closer look at our examples of State practice, and at other situations in which the Caroline framework for assessment and criteria for anticipatory action were applied. 
	Our first example was the British action to neutralize the French fleet in 1940. As we have seen, the United Kingdom was confronted with a grave situation in the Summer of 1940 following the forced evacuation of the British Army from Dunkirk with the loss of most of its heavy equipment and the fall of France. One distinct possibility was that the French fleet could be used by Germany to gain overall naval superiority and mount a successful invasion – or cut Britain’s lifelines and starve it into submission. In the event, Hitler was reluctant to mount an invasion of Great Britain and put off facing that possibility for a variety of reasons until he had no choice. It does not appear that he seriously considered the possibility of using the French fleet to gain the naval superiority that the British leadership so much feared. Instead he probably gave it little consideration at the time beyond its usefulness in achieving a favorable armistice with France.
	However, this is all historical hindsight. The British Government did not know, nor could it know what was going through Hitler’s mind, or which plans Germany might have for continuing the war. At the time, it appeared very possible that Germany both could and would attempt to gain control of the French fleet in order to mount a successful invasion. Although the British Government had no concrete information indicating Germany was actually contemplating such action, much less when such an attempt would be carried out, nevertheless, it was a distinct possibility which they had to take into account. Failure to do so could very well have ended in their defeat. In other words, under the specific (and exceptional) circumstances that existed in the Summer of 1940, the threat posed by the distinct possibility that Germany could gain control over the French fleet was “immediate, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation”. It is a question of reasonableness, taking into account the relevant circumstances and available options. It was reasonable for Britain to assume that such an attempt could be made at any time once the bulk of the French fleet had returned to France and came under Axis supervision under the terms of the armistice. It was reasonable for Britain to assume that once such an attempt was made it would be too late. It was reasonable therefore, for Britain to forestall this possibility at the only time it was assured of a clear possibility of success… and so forth.
	The same could be said of the decision of the Tokyo Tribunal not to view the Declaration of War by the Netherlands (East Indies) on 8 December 1941 as an excuse for the Japanese invasion, which in the event only occurred weeks later (Japanese forces did not move against the Dutch East Indies until mid-January 1942 once they had achieved their initial objectives elsewhere in the South East Asia). The Japanese strike on Pearl Harbor on the preceding day and the opening of its offensive across the Pacific were clear indications that the Japanese intended to gain military superiority which was aimed at gaining control over the entire Pacific and South East Asia region. Under those circumstances, it was reasonable for the Dutch Government to assume that it was only a matter of time before the Dutch East Indies would be invaded and to take the step of declaring war in the hope of mounting some kind of joint defense with the United States, Britain and Australia, rather than waiting to be picked off in piecemeal fashion. The fact that this joint defense failed to thwart the Japanese invasion is irrelevant in legal terms.
	Turning to the second example of the Six Day War, it is equally clear that the reason why this is generally considered to be a classic example of a lawful recourse to anticipatory action in self-defense is not so much a question of whether there was clear evidence of an impending attack within the immediate future, but because under the circumstances it was reasonable for Israel to take the course of action it did. The conduct of Israel’s neighbors in creating a crisis situation, engaging in preparations which would have enabled them to launch an attack, combined with their hostile pronouncements and attitude formed an immediate threat which Israel was justified in responding to through anticipatory action in self-defense. Irrespective of whether such an attack was in fact on the point of being launched, or ever would have been launched, Israel had every reason at the time to believe that there was a very likely possibility, that an attack would be mounted within the near future. How near was an unknown factor – but one which under the circumstances hardly mattered. Likewise, it was clear that waiting any longer would only increase its own vulnerability, without any likely probability that the situation would resolve itself other than through recourse to military force.
	In short, immediacy in relation to anticipatory self-defense is not primarily a question of time, but one of the existence of a credible threat of probable or in exceptional cases potential attack, which together with necessity, the absence of feasible alternatives, make the taking of anticipatory action justifiable or even imperative. While time is a relevant consideration, it is not the only one, nor is it necessarily the most important one.
	We will now turn to our next two examples of State practice to see why they fail to meet the test of lawful anticipatory action. The first of these, the Israeli air strike on the nuclear facility at Osirak essentially fails on the question of the existence of a credible threat, based on the information known at the time. Even if Israel had reason to believe that Iraq would try to circumvent the terms of its purchase agreement and the IAEA inspection procedures, and would try to engage in the development and production of nuclear weapons, this was still a far cry from a credible threat of an attack within the foreseeable future for which no alternative courses of action were available. It normally takes a State years between gaining first access to nuclear technology and the production of nuclear weapons. With this in mind, and taking into account the uncertainty of Iraqi intentions at the time, it seems fairly clear that Israel was not confronted in 1981 with the prospect of even a potential nuclear attack by Iraq for which no feasible alternatives to the taking of military action were available. Even though subsequent events go a considerable way in justifying Israel’s decision to strike preemptively, they do not make its action lawful.
	This seems, if anything, even more true of the US decision to invade Iraq in 2003 insofar as that action was based on reliance on the right of (anticipatory) self-defense. Whatever other justifications there might be for the US/UK decision to use force against Iraq in terms of existing or implied Security Council authorization, or the law governing breach of armistices and cease-fires; there was no credible evidence of any Iraqi intention or preparation to attack the United States, either on its own, or in concert with or in support of any terrorist group or organization.
	These two examples fail to meet the criteria for the lawful exercise of anticipatory self-defense essentially because they were not persuasive or reasonable under the circumstances. There were too many uncertainties regarding the existence of credible threats and too many possibilities for alternative courses of action, even if a potential threat in the future existed.


3.4	The “Bush Doctrine”, Self-Defense and the UN Collective Security System

	This brings us to the so-called “Bush Doctrine” of preventive self-defense as it is set out in the US national security position paper of September 2002. This doctrine is flawed in a number of ways, some of which have received significant attention and some of which have been largely ignored. Firstly, it is mistaken in taking as its starting point the position that anticipatory self-defense is dependent upon an outmoded concept of imminent threat in the form of “a visible mobilization of armies, navies and air forces for an attack”​[74]​. There was no question of such a mobilization forming an immediate threat in this sense in the original Caroline incident, which after all, only involved one Great Lakes steam vessel and a handful of active American participants in a rebellion across the border in British Canada. Nor was this the case with regard to all subsequent examples of State practice, such as the neutralization of the French fleet by the Royal Navy in 1940, or even contemporary examples such as the US led campaign in Afghanistan following the attack of 11 September 2001​[75]​.
	In the former example, there was no question of any mobilization of the French Navy for an attack on Great Britain, rather the mere existence of the French fleet, combined with the distinct possibility that it might fall into the wrong hands was essentially what constituted immediacy in that case. In the latter case, the existence of a significant Al Qaeda presence and infrastructure in Afghanistan with the knowledge and support of the Taliban, seen together with the occurrence of a series of attacks in the past and the likelihood of further attacks in the foreseeable future constituted immediacy, without there being any question of a conventional mobilization of armed forces in the sense referred to above. To be sure, such a mobilization is one way in which immediacy can be manifested, as was the case in relation to the Six Day War, but it is not, nor has it ever been, a necessary precondition of the exercise of anticipatory self-defense.
	However, this may appear to some to be a rather nit-picking criticism, were it not for the fact that this statement is in fact a prelude to a much more serious flaw in the reasoning of the “Bush Doctrine”. The position paper goes on to state that “the concept of an immediate threat needs to be redefined to take account of new capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries”. It further states that “in an age where the enemies of civilization openly and actively seek the world’s most destructive technologies, the United States cannot remain idle while dangers gather”​[76]​.
	The essential problem with this reasoning is that when taken together and seen in context, it no only seems to imply that the existing concept of anticipatory self-defense is obsolete and by its nature inadequate to deal with contemporary threats, without offering any evidence that this is in fact the case; but also seems to reject the basis of the right of self-defense and the contemporary jus ad bellum as a whole on the basis of a perceived, but never really argued, much less proven inadequacy of that system to deal with both real and potential threats. Finally, the reasoning in the “Bush Doctrine” attempts to shift the parameters of immediacy and the notion of (anticipatory) self-defense itself to deal with a vague new concept of inchoate threats which could manifest themselves at some point of time in the future, rather than as a mechanism to address a concrete or probable threat of attack within the foreseeable future. If the implication of reasoning in the “Bush Doctrine” is that the existing right of self-defense is inherently incapable of dealing with situations in which the United States, or any other State for that matter (another point of criticism of the “Bush Doctrine” is that it seems to reserve this new definition of immediacy and an enlarged right of self-defense to itself, which not only is unrealistic, but is nonsense in a legal, ethical and political sense), is confronted with a credible threat of an impeding or even probable attack within the foreseeable future, it is based on an incorrect premise and fundamental misreading of the scope of the right of self-defense. The existing right of self-defense, combining both Charter and customary law, has long included the right to take anticipatory action against concrete and credible threats of attack, either from States or from other sources, irrespective of the nature of the attack (conventional, irregular or “asymmetrical”) or the type of weapons employed (WMD or conventional weapons). Obviously, the right to take (anticipatory) action in self-defense is not and cannot be unlimited. It is predicated upon the principles of necessity and proportionality, interpreted in relation to the nature of the threat and the availability, or lack thereof, of feasible alternatives which would adequately address the threat. These are not outmoded concepts in the present day, and need not be seen as overly restrictive or necessarily condemning a State to a purely reactive posture, provided the evidence of the threat of attack is persuasive and the abovementioned principles of necessity and proportionality are taken into account in conducting the anticipatory exercise of self-defense.
	We have hopefully demonstrated on the basis of the preceding examination of State practice that the Caroline criteria should not be seen as a sort of verbal straitjacket which would prevent a state from taking the necessary action to forestall concrete and credible threats of attack within the foreseeable future. Instead they provide and should continue to provide a framework of assessment for the taking of a variety of degrees of anticipatory action which operate on the basis of reasonableness and the taking into account of the relevant circumstances. There is no compelling evidence that the concepts of immediacy and necessity have suddenly become outmoded and incapable of being applied in relation to contemporary circumstances. They are capable of being applied flexibly and in relation to a wide variety of situations. However, they are fundamental and essential to the nature of the right of self-defense itself. There can be no self-defense without the existence of a concrete and credible threat of attack within the foreseeable future. Without that relationship, there would be virtually no limits to the use of force under the guise of self-defense.
	If, however, the implication put forward in the U.S. national security strategy position paper is that self-defense is or should be relevant to situations in which there is no concrete threat of an attack, but only the general possibility of an attack from an indeterminate source and at some indefinite point in the future, this would result in a total redefinition of the entire concept of self-defense and in the complete replacement of the present legal system governing the use of force. Self-defense however defined, has always been linked to the existence of a concrete (threat of an) attack within at least the foreseeable future. While this is not necessarily the immediate temporal future in the sense of minutes, hours or even days, the principles of immediacy and necessity are central to the concept of self-defense itself and cannot be virtually open-ended as the national security strategy position paper implies.
	It seems clear from the foregoing that the position put forward in the national security strategy document fails on at least two counts. Firstly, that the existing right of self-defense is incapable of being applied to contemporary threats and is inadequate to counter such concrete threats of attack. Secondly, that self-defense is or should be relevant in situations where no such concrete threat of attack exists. The first position is based upon a misreading of the right of (anticipatory) self-defense, while the second position dispenses with the notion of self-defense altogether and in fact is something completely different from self-defense as it has always existed, both prior to the Charter and since the Charter has come into force.
	That “something different” is the crux of the problem and of the controversy surrounding the so-called “Bush Doctrine”. Under the contemporary legal system, the use of force other than in self-defense can only be undertaken by the Security Council, or by a regional organization or a (coalition of) State(s) acting under the authorization of the Council. The Council has extensive powers to take any measures it determines is required, including the use of military force to deal with situations other than self-defense in response to an attack or concrete threat of attack. To be sure it has not, nor will it always be capable of using those powers effectively and it is by no means a perfect institution. There is clearly room for considerable improvement in its effectiveness and legitimacy. One way of doing this would be to work towards some kind of coherent international security strategy to deal with the general long term problems of the possibility of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international terrorism and the underlying structural problems which contribute to and aggravate these phenomena​[77]​. Clearly, this is a task beyond the capacity of any single State or group of States and one which could complement the efforts and policies of States directed towards addressing these problems. However, this option does not even seem to have been considered in the national security strategy position paper; indeed there is no mention of the UN Collective Security system made in it at all. This is an additional reason why it has caused so much dissension.
	The answer to what is in effect a challenge to the present legal structure governing the use of force should be twofold. Firstly, to reach a realistic understanding and interpretation of the scope and limits of the right of self-defense which takes into account the possibility of anticipatory action in relation to concrete threats of attack, including persuasive evidence of probable attack within the foreseeable future in accordance with the Caroline criteria, but at the same time does not try to extend the concept of self-defense to situations where no such concrete threat exists, or substitute self-defense for collective security. Secondly, a real attempt to utilize the collective security system of the Charter in relation to problems and situations not covered by self-defense. This should include an effort on the part of the Council and the broader international community to work out a coherent strategy and the means to implement it for dealing with challenges and threats to international security to which no known or generally acceptable concept of self-defense has any relevance.




4	The Temporal Dimension of the Right of Self-Defense II:





	In the preceding paragraph we examined the question of anticipatory self-defense and discussed, among other things, the notion of immediacy within the context of the Caroline criteria as one of the prerequisites for the taking of anticipatory action in self-defense. Viewed from that perspective, immediacy is synonymous with the existence of an imminent or immediate threat of an armed attack. In that context, it was concluded that immediacy is not primarily a question of time, but one of the existence of a credible threat of probable or in some cases even potential attack, which will depend upon the factual circumstances of each particular situation.
	We will now turn to immediacy in another context, namely, that of immediacy in a more general sense as one of the core criteria alongside necessity and proportionality for the use of force in self-defense​[78]​. In this more general sense, immediacy is often seen as the dividing line between self-defense and armed reprisal and would imply according to this view a duty on the part of the defending State to exercise the right of self-defense within a very short time span after the occurrence of an armed attack. Failure to do so would signify that any armed response would lose its character of self-defense and instead constitute an armed reprisal, which is generally considered to be illegal under contemporary international law. In this paragraph, we will examine whether such a requirement for instant response in fact forms part of the right of self-defense, either as part of the customary dimension, or on the basis of the Charter.


4.2	Immediacy as an Independent Criterion for the Exercise of the Right of Self-Defense

	The reasons for the contention that self-defense is subject to a requirement of immediate exercise following the occurrence of an armed attack, or the manifestation of a threat of armed attack can almost certainly be traced to two sources. The first of these is the association by many individuals of the right of self-defense at international law with the concept of personal self-defense against illegal assault which exists under the domestic criminal law of all States in one form or another. The second is the understandable desire to have a clear distinction between the right of self-defense which is recognized under the Charter and under customary international law as lawful, and the concept of armed reprisal, which has no legal basis under contemporary international law​[79]​.
	With regard to the first of these reasons, it would appear that even where no direct link is claimed to exist between the right of States to exercise self-defense and the right of individuals to do so under domestic criminal law, that nevertheless much thinking regarding the former variant is influenced by the scope and limitations on the right of self-defense which exist in the latter variant. Under the domestic criminal law of States, self-defense is generally seen as narrow ground for justifying what would otherwise be criminal behavior, and which is of a temporary and restricted nature. The premise for this is, of course, that the use of coercion is restricted to the State which has the monopoly of the use of force in any well ordered society, and the responsibility and sole right to maintain public order and uphold the domestic legal order. Of course, this is not always the reality in practice. Not all States are capable of fulfilling these responsibilities. However, such States have been traditionally seen as aberrations from the norm. The more stable and well ordered a society and its State structure are, the more restrictive the right of self-defense under domestic law is likely to be.
	It is almost impossible to imagine a scenario under domestic criminal law in which an individual would be justified in taking action in self-defense other than at the moment an illegal assault took place, or (perhaps) immediately prior or subsequent to an assault. Certainly, once any appreciable amount of time had lapsed after an assault had taken place, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to justify any type of violent response in terms of self-defense under the domestic laws of most countries.
	However, despite the tempting nature of domestic analogies, it is clear that the right of States to exercise self-defense under international law cannot be compared to the rights of individuals to do so under domestic law. Despite the common roots of these two variants of self-defense in natural law doctrine, they are completely distinct and operate within totally different contexts and environments. 
	International relations and the corresponding international legal order are characterized by a degree of decentralization and horizontalism which are radically different from the situation which exists in anything even resembling a well ordered and stable domestic legal order. Individuals are not States and the Security Council is by no means a world government exercising control over a well established and effective criminal justice system.	
	As to the second reason behind the contention that self-defense is subject to a requirement that it be exercised immediately in order to be able to distinguish legitimate self-defense from illegal armed reprisal; the question should be whether the distinction lies principally in the amount of time which occurs between an attack and the response by the victim State, or whether other factors, such as the nature, purpose and objective of the response are in fact more important. While self-defense and armed reprisal are both forms of self-help and have certain characteristics in common, they are quite distinct in terms of their respective purposes and objectives. The purpose of self-defense is to ward off and, if necessary, to defeat an attack. The purpose of armed reprisal is to redress an injustice and mete out a degree of punishment to the wrongdoer. Although it is not always possible to make a complete distinction between the two forms of self-help in practice, the differing purposes and  underlying objectives between the two forms of self-help make it generally possible to distinguish between action which is primarily defensive and action which has retribution as its primary objective. The grey area between self-defense and reprisals is sometimes referred to as “defensive armed reprisals”, which may be a particular type of self-defense which blends elements of both types of self-help​[80]​.  In any case, it is submitted that the question of whether a particular action qualifies as self-defense of will depend primarily on the issue of whether such action was necessary to ward off an ongoing attack or defer continued attack, and not whether the response was immediately forthcoming subsequent to the attack.
	There are various reasons why immediacy applied in this context should not serve as a kind of litmus test as to whether a particular action should qualify as self-defense rather than as a reprisal. The first of these is that neither the right of self-defense under customary law, nor under the Charter was or is subject to such a requirement. There are many situations in which a State may not be in a position to respond immediately to an armed attack, or to the clear threat of attack. These could include a lack of military preparedness, the amount of time involved in deploying forces over large distances, an imbalance in military capabilities between the attacking and defending States, taking into account that counter-attack can constitute legitimate defense in many situations, the need for a State to consult with and receive support from allies, and so forth. One particular reason why it may not be possible for a State to reply instantly to a particular form of armed attack: a so-called indirect attack which is carried out covertly or through third parties such as armed bands, terrorist groups acting under the direction of or cooperation with a State, is because it will not always be clear who the author of the attack is. Under such circumstances, the victim State will have to assure itself and other States and actors within the international community that when it takes action in self-defense, it does so against those responsible for the attack on the basis of reasonable evidence​[81]​.
	The second reason why immediacy in the sense of a requirement that defensive action must follow an attack quickly or not at all lies in the underlying purpose and rationale of self-defense itself. Although this is linked to the first set of considerations of a more practical nature, it is in fact fundamental. An armed attack is a serious threat to a State’s independence and integrity – so serious that it gives rise to the only clearly accepted exception to the prohibition of the use of force by States which is central to the entire contemporary international legal system. There is no persuasive reason why a State should be expected to forfeit its rights to integrity and independence simply because it is not in a position to be able to instantly respond militarily to an attack. To accept such a condition would be tantamount to accepting a gross inequality in the international legal rights of States. It would result in a situation whereby a powerful State which had the means at its disposal to respond instantly to any type of attack would have more right to defend itself than a State, which for whatever reason, was less able to do so. Clearly this could not be an acceptable outcome, nor one which reflects the underlying purpose of the right of self-defense or of the Charter itself.





	In the preceding paragraphs we have undertaken an examination of the “temporal dimension” of self-defense. The question of the existence of and the limits to a right to take anticipatory action in response to the threat of an armed attack has been examined on the basis of State practice. We have also looked at the questions and challenges posed by the National Security Strategy regulating the use of force and in those contexts looked at the relationship between self-defense and the Collective Security System of the United Nations.
	With regard to the question of the existence of a right of anticipatory self-defense, we have attempted to demonstrate that a right to take anticipatory action in self-defense has long existed under customary international law and continues to exist under the Charter legal structure governing the use of force. The basis for this right is long-standing State practice which spans a period extending over sixty years since the period immediately preceding the formation of the Charter right up to the present, together with significant evidence of the existence of opinio juris in the form of the Caroline criteria as a set of guiding principles which have provided a useful and generally accepted framework of assessment for the taking of anticipatory action in self-defense in a variety of situations.
	In examining a number of examples in which anticipatory action was taken and these criteria were applied, it became clear that full account must be given to the relevant circumstances of each specific situation and that in doing so, it is inevitable that the concept of an immediate or imminent threat of attack is a flexible one which allows a State to take anticipatory action when there is persuasive evidence of the existence of a probable, or in exceptional circumstances, even a potential or clear threat of attack within the foreseeable future. However, it is equally clear that although this concept is a flexible one, it is not nor can it be an open ended one which would allow the taking of anticipatory action in the absence of a credible threat of attack, or would permit or preventive action against the mere possibility that an attack could possibly occur at some indeterminate point of time, without disregarding the concept of self-defense altogether. This is why the newly formulated national security strategy of the United States, sometimes referred to as the “Bush Doctrine” has proven to be so controversial and generally unacceptable and why its acceptance would result in a total rewriting of the legal system governing the use of force. The alternative to such a rewriting of the law governing the use of force consists of a combination of a reasonable application of the existing law governing anticipatory self-defense and a realistic attempt to utilize the machinery of the UN collective security system before determining that the law needs to be discarded and replaced.
	With regard to the respective roles of the right of self-defense and the UN Collective Security System it was concluded that the existence of self-defense, indeed the very notion of self-defense as a legal right, has always been predicated upon the occurrence of an attack or the concrete threat of an attack in the immediate future. “Immediacy” should not be interpreted rigidly to restrict the defensive measures to simply reacting to or interception of an attack which has been initiated, but can include response of a truly anticipatory character to a clear and concrete threat of an attack within the foreseeable future, subject to the legal guidelines contained in the Caroline criteria which encompass necessity and proportionality in addition to immediacy. That is the limit of self-defense for it to remain such. In relation to threats and situations which do not constitute such threats of attack, there can be no role for self-defense. 
	That is why the notion of preventive self-defense in relation to inchoate threats amounting to mere possibilities at some indeterminate point in the future, as is advanced in the “Bush Doctrine” have no place within the right of self-defense and it is submitted, should have no such role.
	With regard to the second of the temporal aspects we have examined, it was concluded that for considerations of both a practical and of a fundamental nature, no requirement exists that the right of self-defense must be exercised immediately subsequent to the occurrence of an armed attack or be forfeited. Acceptance of such a requirement would in many cases result in a State being forced to attempt self-defense in situations where it was placed at a severe disadvantage, or on the basis of incomplete information. Acceptance of such a requirement would not only ignore military, political, and legal realities, but would be extremely unreasonable and inequitable, and would ignore one of the central tenets of the international legal system. This is, of course, that all States have an equal right to sovereignty, independence and security. As long as there is a continued necessity of self-defense, this right will remain active.













^1	  National Security Strategy of the United States at www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html. A number of justifications were advanced by the US Government for the use of force against Iraq. Among these were references to the necessity of preventing Iraq from engaging in an attack upon the United States, U.S. interests in the Middle East and neighboring States in the region by the use of weapons of mass destruction, or the proliferation by the Iraqi Government of such weapons to terrorist movements. See “Pre-emption, Iraq and International Law“ Comments by W.H. Taft IV and T.F. Buchwald in the Agora section of 97 AJIL (2003) 567.
^2	  A significant number of scholars oppose any notion of anticipatory or preemptive self-defense prior to the actual launching of an armed attack. These include, inter alia, Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force Between States (1963), 275-78; Bothe, “Terrorism and the Legality of Pre-emptive Force” in 14 EJIL (2003) no. 3, 227 and Randelzhofer ‘Article 51’ in B. Simma (ed.) The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (2nd ed. 2002) 803. Another group of scholars takes the position that anticipatory self-defense is permissible within the strict limits of the Caroline criteria, e.g. Greenwood, “International Law and the Pre-emptive Use of Force” in 4 San Diego International Law Journal 7 (2004); D. Bowett, Self-Defense in International Law (1958) at 185-86; T. Franck, Recourse to Force (2002), 97 et seq.; and Waldock, “The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International Law” in 81 RCADI (1952) 451 at 462-64.
^3	  Since the events of “9-11”, a third body of opinion has emerged within the debate on the parameters of self-defense which takes the position that pre-emptive action is justified not only within the traditional limits of the Caroline  doctrine against immediate and manifest threats, but also to counter threats which are more remote in the future. See e.g. Sofaer, “On the Necessity of Pre-emption” in 14 EJIL (2003) no. 2, 209; and the comments by Taft and Buchwald referred to in n. 1, supra. 
^4	  Immediacy can be used in two different contexts. Firstly, in relation to the concept of an imminent or immediate threat of an attack within the context of anticipatory self-defense, which will be the subject of attention in the context of this article. Secondly as a requirement for taking action in self-defense within a short span of time subsequent to an attack in order to distinguish self-defense from reprisal. Used in the latter sense, immediacy is often seen as one of the requirements for the exercise of self-defense alongside necessity and proportionality. See in relation to this latter context inter alia Y. Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defense (2nd ed. 1997) 202, 215, 219-20 and 235-37; Ago, “Addendum to Eighth Report on State Responsibility”, (1980) II (1) ILC Yearbook 13 at 69 and Schmitt, “Preemptive Strategies in International Law” in 24 Mich. J. Int’l Law (2003) 513 at 533. Immediacy used in this sense will be given secondary consideration within the context of this article in Paragraph 4 infra.
^5	  See e.g. Dinstein, op. cit. supra n. 4 at 101-16.
^6	  See n. 72 infra.
^7	  Bowett, supra n. 2, 182-3, Goodrich, Hambro and Simons, Charter of the United Nations, 342-44, Waldock, surpra n. 2, 503-04. The Act of Chapaltupec was concluded on 22 March 1945 and provided for mutual assistance between the Inter American States in the event of external aggression and was published in Dept of State Bull. XVI, 967-70.
^8	  Dinstein, supra n. 4, 249, O. Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice, (1991) 155.
^9	  E.g. C. Gray, International Law and the Use of Force (2002) 86-7.
^10	  R. Jennings and A. Watts Oppenheim’s International Law 9th ed. Vol.1 “Peace”, Parts 2-4 at 1279
^11	  This follows from the general doctrine of interpretation of sources. I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (4th ed.) 1990, 3-4; Jennings and Watts, supra n. 10, 25-26, R. Bernhard, “Customary International Law” in Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Vol. 7, 61-62.
^12	  See e.g. Dinstein, supra n. 4, 177.
^13	  The territorial scope of self-defense is, moreover, subject to proportionality, which can have geographical connotations alongside other considerations. See e.g. Dinstein, supra n. 4, 175 et seq. and Schachter supra n. 8, 153-54.
^14	  See inter alia N. Schrijver, “Responding to International Terrorism: Moving the Frontiers of International Law for ‘Infinite Justice’” in 48 Neth. Int’l Law Rev. no. 3 (2001) 271 ff. ASIL Insights, www.asil.org, “Terrorist Attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon” comments by Kirgis et al.; T.D. Gill, “The Eleventh of September and the Right of Self-Defense” in W.P. Heere (ed.) Terrorism and the Military: International Legal Implications (2003) 24-30.
^15	  Self-defense as a legal concept has its roots in natural law doctrine and in that context makes no clear distinction between personal self-defense and self-defense at the international level. See e.g. Bowett, supra n. 2, 3-5 and Dinstein, supra n. 4, 176. However, in (modern) positive law they are distinct rights, notwithstanding their common roots. The right of self-defense at international law has evolved distinctly from the right of individuals to protect themselves from illegal assault under national law. See in addition to these sources inter alia Bryde, “Self-Defense” in R. Bernhardt Encyclopedia of Public International Law Vol. 4, 212, Brownlie, op. cit. supra n. 2, 216 et seq.
^16	  See inter alia Articles 1(1), and 51 of the Charter. This is especially clear from the wording of Article 51 and is often referred to in the literature. See e.g. Dinstein, supra n. 4, 208, Waldock supra n. 2, 495 and Gray, supra n. 9, 104-5.
^17	  See e.g. Dinstein, supra n. 4, 279 et seq.; Goodrich, Hambro & Simon, supra n. 7, 293 et seq.; Koskenniemi, “The Place of Law in Collective Security” in N. White (ed.) Collective Security Law (2004), 5; Greenwood, supra n. 2, 19 and Frowein and Krisch “Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression” in B. Simma (ed.) The Charter of the United Nations (2nd ed., 2002) 701 et seq.
^18	  Dinstein, supra, n. 4, 203-04.
^19	  Id. 206-07. See also inter alia Schachter, supra n. 8, 401-04; and Gill, “Legal and Some Political Limitations on the Power of the UN Security Council to Exercise its Enforcement Powers under Chapter VII of the Charter” in 26 Neth. Yrbk Int’l Law (1995) 33, at 90 ff.
^20	  Schachter, supra, n. 8, 146-50, Waldock supra, n. 2, 495.
^21	  Bowett, supra n. 2, 184-85, Waldock, supra, n. 2, 496-97.
^22	  The text of Article 51 reads in relevant part as follows: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations … For a discussion of the notion of an armed attack see inter alia, Dinstein supra n. 4, 182 et seq.; Randelzhofer, “Article 51” in Simma, supra n. 2, 792 et seq.; and Gill “The Law of Armed Attack in the Context of the Nicaragua Case” in 1 Hague Yrbk Int’l Law (1988), 30 ff.
^23	  See sources cited in n. 7 supra. See additionally, Kearley, “Regulation of Preventive and Preemptive Force in the United Nations Charter: A Search for Original Intent”, in 3 Wyoming Law Review (2003) 663, 680-82.
^24	  See the sources cited in nn. 7 and 21 supra.
^25	  Among the authors who rely upon a strict and literal interpretation of Article 51 are inter alia Brownlie, supra n. 2, 271-72; Gray, supra n. 9, 98-99 and Cassese, International Law (2nd ed. 2005) 254-55.
^26	  See Bowett, supra n. 2, 141-44. For the Nuremburg Judgment relating to the relevance of the Caroline criteria to the German plea of preventive self-defense in relation to its invasion of Norway, see Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of German Major War Criminals (HMSO 1946), 28-30. For the declaration of war by the Netherlands on Japan see Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (1948), 994-5.
^27	  ICJ Reports 1986, 14, para 195 at 103.
^28	  In addition to the dissenting opinions of Judges Jennings and Schwebel see inter alia Dinstein, supra n. 4, 192-94 and 199-202, Hargrove, “The Nicaragua Judgment and the Future of the Law of Force and Self-Defense” in 81 AJIL 135 (1987), Franck, supra n. 2, 62-3. For a critique of aspects of the Court’s Judgment by the present author see Gill supra n. 22, 45-50.
^29	  See T. D. Gill, Rosenne’s The World Court: What It is and How It Works, 6th rev. ed., (2003) 125.
^30	  See e.g. 42 ILM (2003) 1334 for the ICJ Judgment in the Oil Platforms case. For the Court’s pronouncements on the burden of proof in relation to the existence of an armed attack on a US reflagged tanker Sea Isle City by an anti-ship missile allegedly fired from the Iranian held Fao Peninsula and a mine attack on a US naval vessel, the USS Samuel B. Roberts, see paras. 53-61 at 1355-57 and paras. 69-71 at 1359-60. The Court indicated that the evidence was respectively “suggestive” and “highly suggestive” in relation to those two incidents, but insufficient to establish Iranian involvement, without in any way indicating what the requisite burden of proof is to establish involvement in an armed attack. This and other aspects of the Court’s judgment come in for some vigorous criticism by a number of the judges in the case in their individual opinions including Judge Higgins id. 1384-86, Kooymans, id. 1396-97, Buergenthal, id. 1413-16 and Owada, id. 1424-25.
^31	  The Court’s decision was taken by 14-2 votes on the question of whether the US action against Iranian oil platforms was justified under the law relating to the use of force and on the finding that the US had not breached its obligations relating to the freedom of commerce under a 1955 bilateral FCN Treaty. By joining these two issues into one paragraph of the dispositief, the optical illusion was created of near unanimity where this was not the case. On the other hand, there can be no doubt that a significant majority within the Court found the US reliance on self-defense to be unwarranted.
^32	  For the Court’s references to necessity and proportionality in the Nicaragua decision see op. cit. supra n. 27, para 194 at 103 for the Court’s references to these criteria in relation to the Oil Platforms decision, see supra n. 30 at 1362.
^33	  Necessity and proportionality as criteria for the legal exercise of the right of self-defense can trace their roots back to at least the Caroline incident (see par. 2.3. below). For references to and some description of necessity in the literature see, inter alia Dinstein, supra n. 4, 202-3, and Gray, supra n. 9, 105-8.
^34	  For example of authors adhering to the strict or literalist approach to Article 51 see nn. 2 and 25 supra. Examples of authors who acknowledge or support a right of anticipatory self-defense are given in n. 2 supra. Another authority within this group includes Judge Dame Rosalyn Higgins Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (1994) 242-43.
^35	 See inter alia M. Byers, War Law (2005) 53-4, Brownlie, op. cit. supra n. 2, 42-3, Dinstein, supra n. 4, 243-4, Franck, supra n. 2, 97-98 etc. The most authoritative article on the Caroline incident remains without doubt that by Jennings, “The Caroline and McLeod Cases” in 32 AJIL (1938) 82 et seq. The primary source for the Caroline incident is the exchange of correspondence between Webster and Fox in 29 BFSP, 1137-8 and Webster and Ashburton in 30 BFSP, 195 et seq.
^36	  Jennings, supra n. 35 at 92.
^37	  See n. 26 supra.
^38	  Among those who reject anticipatory action altogether are the sources referred to in nn. 2 and 25 supra. Authors who concede the possibility of anticipatory or interceptive action strictly within a restrictive sense of responding to an incipient attack or one which has been initiated, but has not yet crossed an international frontier or reached its target, include Dinstein, supra n. 4, 188-190 and perhaps Waldock, supra n. 2, 497-98.
^39	  Authors who concede the possibility of anticipatory or interceptive self-defense in relation to incipient attacks include Dinstein, supra n. 4, 188-90 and perhaps Waldock, supra n. 2, 497-98.
^40	  Authors who take the position that Caroline allows for anticipatory action in response to a clear threat of an attack which has yet to be initiated include Bowett, op. cit. n. 2 at 185-86, Franck op. cit. n. 2, 97 et seq.; Greenwood, op. cit. n. 2, 13-14 and Higgins, op. cit. n. 34, 242.
^41	  Supra, nn. 1 and 3.
^42	  The Caroline incident was but part, albeit an important and at the time emotive one, of a larger set of issues which complicated the relations between Great Britain and the United States at that time. These included inter alia the resolution of a frontier dispute which dated back to the American War of Independence involving the border between America’s New England States and British North America. Neither side was interested in a military confrontation, although if handled differently, the Caroline incident could easily have resulted in war. Webster as Secretary of State was interested in resolving the incident in such a way that America’s territorial integrity and sensitivities would be respected and British freedom of action to intervene militarily into the US territory along the long and lightly defended US Canadian border would be curtailed as far as possible. As the weaker party in the controversy, these goals were reflected in the very restrictive definition of self-defense used by Webster in his letter of 24 April 1841 to the British Envoy to the United States, Mr. Fox, repeated later in his correspondence with Lord Ashburton. The reply by Ashburton acknowledging the parameters of self-defense, while skillfully insisting that the British action had met the conditions set by Webster, was intended to facilitate an amicable solution and contribute to an overall settlement of the issues besetting Anglo-American relations at the time. Their mutual commitment to restraint and the achievement of a compromise solution resulted in success in the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842, which effectively resolved the outstanding controversies affecting the relations between the two countries. This would not have been possible without a face-saving compromise on the Caroline and McLeod issues which satisfied the interests of both parties. It should be emphasized that while the Caroline incident took place at a time that States were still legally free to resort to war, the United States and Great Britain were not at war when the incident took place, nor did they want to go to war for the reasons given above. Consequently, Great Britain required a legal justification for taking armed action on U.S. territory as a “measure short of war”, which is the reason behind the diplomatic correspondence subsequent to the incident, and more to the point, why this incident has had a continuing legal significance to the present day in an era when the use of force is subject to legal regulation. For an authoritative treatment of the diplomacy surrounding the Caroline incident within the context of the overall complex dispute see in addition to the sources cited in n. 35 supra, K.E. Shewmaker (ed.), Daniel Webster “The Completist Man” (1990) 203 et seq.
^43	  Two excellent accounts of the Battle of France and the Low Countries can be found in A. Horne, To Lose a Battle: France 1940 (Penguin Edition 1979) 245 et seq., and Wm. L. Shirer, The Collapse of the Third Republic (Heinemann Edition 1970) 582 et seq.
^44	  The terms of the Armistice Agreement are dealt with in Shirer supra n. 43, 862-3 and W.S. Churchill, The Second World War (abridged Penguin edition 1989) 312-5. The relevant provision in relation to the French fleet was Article 8 which read in part: The French Fleet, excepting the units necessary for safeguarding French colonial interests “shall be collected in ports to be specified and there demobilized and disarmed under German or Italian control” (Churchill, op. cit. 315). The word “control” (Fr. “contrôle”) may well have partially contributed to British anxiety in relation to the fate of the French vessels. In English the term denotes a “restraining power”, “authority” or “government” while in French the term denotes “inspection” or “supervision”, which is how I have translated it in the text. See in this respect Lukacs, op. cit. n. 48 infra, 161.
^45	  The comparative strength of the French Fleet in relation to other major naval powers at the outbreak of the war is given in R.E. Dupuy and T.N. Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of Military History (2nd Rev. Ed. Published by Jane’s 1986) at 1052 and 1127. A complete description of all French war vessels is given in P. Auphan and J. Mordal, La Marine Française dans la Seconde Guerre Mondiale (1967) in Annex 1, 607 et seq. For the role of the French Navy in the period between September 1939 and June 1940 see the latter work, 55-71. For Darlan’s role in building up the French Navy, see Churchill op. cit. 313.
^46	  On Churchill’s contacts with Darlan in general and specifically in relation to the position of the French Fleet in the days immediately preceding the armistice see id. 313-4. On the probable effect of Darlan’s appointment as Minister of Marine see id. 314. See also R.O. Paxton, Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order 1940-1944 (1972).
^47	  Paxton, op. cit. supra n. 45, 7-19 and Shirer, op. cit. n. 42, 852 et seq.
^48	  Churchill, op. cit. n. 43, 315. See also, J. Lukacs, The Duel: 10 May-31 July 1940: The Eighty-Day Struggle Between Churchill and Hitler (1990), 160 et seq. and Dupuy and Dupuy, op. cit. n. 45, 1063-4.
^49	  Churchill in id. 415-6. Churchill described the decision to take action to prevent the French Fleet carrying out the terms of the Armistice as a “Greek Tragedy”.
^50	  Id. 316. 
^51	  Dupuy and Dupuy n. 45 at 1064.
^52	  Paxton, supra n. 46, 56-7.
^53	  Lukacs, supra n. 48, 163.
^54	  Ibid. See also Ciano’s Diary (Heinemann translation 1947) 274 (entry for 4/7/1940). Ciano’s comment was: “For the moment it proves that the fighting spirit of His Britannic Majesty’s fleet is quite alive, and still has the aggressive ruthlessness of the captains and pirates of the seventeenth century”.
^55	  Auphan and Mordal op. cit. n. 45, at 194 quoting Cordell Hull on the impression the British action made upon the United States Government and public. See also Lukacs in id. 162.
^56	  A point that Churchill admits in his memoirs. See Churchill, op. cit. 315.
^57	  On the Six Day War generally see J.N. Moore (ed.) The Arab-Israeli Conflict, Vl. II (Readings) (1974) and III (Documents) (1977). For a concise evaluation of the events leading up to the conflict see Franck supra n. 2, 101-2. For an assessment of the comparative numerical and adversaries, as well as an analysis of the military aspects of the conflict see Dupuy and Dupuy supra n. 45, 1230 et seq.
^58	  Egypt and Jordan concluded a mutual assistance treaty on 30 May 1967. An Egyptian general was immediately dispatched to Jordan to take command of Arab forces on the Jordan front, see Dupuy and Dupuy supra n. 45, 1230.
^59	  Id. 1231.
^60	  Id. 1232-3. See also Franck, supra n. 2, 102-3.
^61	  Franck op. cit. 103 points out that the Soviet draft resolution condemning Israel only gained support from 4 of the Council’s 15 members. The Special Emergency Session of the General Assembly also failed to adopt various draft resolutions condemning Israel, with a draft submitted by a group of non-aligned States (A/L/522) receiving 53 votes in favor, 46 opposed and 20 abstentions and being thereby rejected since it failed to gain the necessary two thirds majority vote. See Franck in id. at 104. An earlier Soviet draft resolution containing stronger condemnatory language had been rejected on 4 July 1967 by 71 votes opposed, 22 in favor and 20 abstentions. (A/L/521). See United Nations Yearbook 1967, 209.
^62	  Various authorities have opined that the Israeli preemptive strike of 5 June 1967 was an exercise of regular rather than anticipatory self-defense. These include Gray op. cit. n. 9 supra at 112, M. Shaw, International Law (3rd ed. 1991) 694 and Dinstein supra n. 4, 55 et seq.
^63	  On this point, I respectfully disagree with Professor Dinstein’s views as set out in op. cit. n. 4 supra at 55-6. To be sure a cease-fire is not necessarily synonymous with peace, nor can it on its own end a technical state of war. However, a prolonged cease-fire can consolidate into a situation of relative normalcy and it is even possible that a cease-fire comes into place by the conduct of the parties rather than through mutual agreement or formal acceptance of a Security Council cease-fire resolution. In any case, once a cease-fire has become a de-facto armistice it is no longer open to the parties to reopen hostilities at a moment of their choosing.
^64	  An example of such a partial blockade which, while hostile and illegal under the Four Power Agreements relating to the Occupation Regime in Germany, was not treated as an armed attack, was the Berlin Blockade of 1948-9 which closed off land communications between the Western Zones of Germany and Berlin, but left the air corridors unaffected. This blockade was far more serious than the closure of the Straits of Tiran, but was not viewed as casus belli.
^65	  This is the view of a large number of authorities and is best summed up by Franck supra n. 2, 104-5.
^66	  In the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution, the U.S., while officially neutral in the war between Iraq and Iran, which had begun in September 1980 while U.S. diplomatic hostages were being held in Tehran, viewed Iran as the greater threat to Middle Eastern security and stability. The U.S.S.R. had a formal treaty of Friendship with Iraq and had supplied the bulk of its already formidable arsenal, while France maintained close commercial ties with Iraq and was also a significant supporter of Iraq’s diplomatic position in 1980-1, see D. Hiro, The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict (1989) 71 et seq.
^67	  Franck, supra n. 2, 105. See also A.M. Weisburd, Use of Force: Practice of States Since World War II (1997), 287-89.
^68	  Greenwood, supra n. 2, 14.
^69	  S.C. Res. 487 of 19/6/81 adopted unanimously.
^70	  The official arguments relating to the justification of the invasion of Iraq are to be found inter alia in Statements by members of the U.S. and U.K. Governments immediately preceding and subsequent to the opening of hostilities in March 2005. See e.g. the Advice of the U.K. Attorney General, Lord Goldsmith, on www.number-10gov.uk, available via www.answers.com/topic/2003-invasion-of-Iraq. For more extensive legal analysis of the arguments relating to the use of force against Iran from the perspective of the present U.S. Administration see the comments by .H. Taft and T.F. Buchwald (respectively Legal Adviser of the U.S. Dept. of State and Asst. Legal Adviser for Political-Military Affairs at the U.S. Dept. of State) and J. Yoo (Former Deputy Assistant Attorney General at the Office of Legal Counsel of the U.S. Dept. of Justice) in the “Agora” Section of 97 AJIL (2003) 577 et seq. For an informative and generally objective account of the factual evidence relating to Iraq’s alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction and the possible legal implications thereof, see D. McGoldrick, From ‘9-11’ to the Iraq War 2003 (2004) 96 et seq. For the presentation by U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell on the evidence of alleged Iraqi non-compliance with S.C. Resolution relating to disarmament see www.whitehouse.gov/releases/2005. (http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/nationalsecurity/)
^71	  The arguments for and against accepting the legality of the invasion of Iraq on the basis of (pre-)existing S.C. Resolutions and or the violation of the cease-fire imposed by the UNSC in S.C. Res. 687 which Iraq had agreed to are given in the aforementioned “Agora” Section of 97 AJIL (2003) by various commentators. See also the views of Sofaer and Bothe in 14 EJIL (2003) cited in nn. 3 and 2 supra respectively. My own view, in a nutshell, is that neither S.C. Res. 1441 viewed on its own, nor viewed in conjunction with S.C. Res. 678 and 687 gave the U.S. and U.K. a right to unilaterally take military action, (beyond localized force protection in response to an immediate threat to units enforcing the S.C. embargo and no-fly zones), much less to conduct a full scale invasion and occupation of Iraq, without further S.C. authorization. Likewise, neither the U.S. nor the U.K. had the right to re-initiate hostilities on the basis of a unilateral breach of the cease-fire provisions of S.C. Res. 687 which had been implemented by the Council as a whole vis-à-vis Iraq and had superseded the interim cease-fire arrangements between the Coalition Forces and the Iraqi Government. On the other hand, the record of Iraqi non-compliance with previous S.C. Resolutions and its obstructionist behavior over a long period, coupled with the widely held perception at the time immediately preceding the invasion in March 2003 that Iraq still probably possessed some weapons of mass destruction should not be discounted, although these factors did not make the invasion lawful. If the invasion had been resisted by chemical or other weapons of mass destruction, or had WMD been uncovered in the subsequent occupation period, this would have gone a long way towards mitigating the unlawfulness of the U.S./U.K. military action. However, as is well known, no such weapons have been encountered and any mitigation such a discovery might have rendered must remain in the realm of historical “might have beens”. 
^72	  Humanitarian intervention is of course a highly controversial and very extensively debated possible legal basis for the use of force outside the context of the U.N. Collective Security System. However, even those authorities who support the possibility that humanitarian intervention is legal or could be to some extent justified, usually do so on the basis of the existence of an acute situation in which the right to life of a significant part of a State’s population is being violated or threatens to be violated, such as was the case in Northern Iraq in the aftermath of the Second Gulf War in 1991, in Rwanda in 1994, or Kosovo in 1999. This is in contrast to the prospect of military intervention to overthrow a despotic regime and promote democracy which has far fewer supporters. This is even more true in relation to State practice. For recent treatment of humanitarian intervention see inter alia, Byers, op. cit. supra n. 35, 85 et seq., Franck, op. cit. n. 2 supra 174 et seq. and S. Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace (2001). For the present author’s views on the topic see “Humanitarian Intervention Legality, Justice and Legitimacy” in The Global Community Yearbook of International Law and Jurisprudence 2004, Vol. II (2005) 51 et seq.
^73	  The “Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States” (The 9-11 Commission) concluded, regarding the question of an alleged link between Al Qaeda and Iraq, that there was “no credible evidence that Saddam Hussein had assisted Al Qaeda in preparing for or carrying out the 9-11 attacks” (quote from www.answers.com/topic/2003-invasionofIraq). For the Report itself, see www.gpoaccess.gov/911, specifically chapter 10 “Wartime”, para. 10.3 “Phase Two and the Question of Iraq”. See also McGoldrick supra n. 70, 17-20.
^74	  See n. 1 supra.
^75	  The invocation of the right of the United States to exercise self-defense in response to the attack of 11 September 2001 and the ensuing use of force against Al Qaeda and its Taliban host and ally in Afghanisatn was recognized or condoned by the U.N. Security Council and a variety of other States and international organizations. Likewise most international legal authorities have expressed agreement that the exercise of the right of self-defense against Afghanistan was lawful as such, notwithstanding criticism of some aspects of the conduct of the military campaign by some. See S.C. Res. 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001). A significant number of States both inside and outside the NATO alliance have provided various forms of military, logistical and diplomatic support to the U.S. effort to eradicate Al Qaeda’s bases in Afghanistan. For support in doctrine see inter alia Greenwood, supra n. 2 and the sources cited in n. 14 supra. The U.S. led campaign was both reactive, and at least to some extent, anticipatory, in that it was directed towards not only responding to the attack of “9-11”, but also towards forestalling future attacks. See in this respect e.g. Greenwood op. cit.  21 et seq.
^76	  NSC Document cited in nn. 1 and 74 supra at 15.
^77	  One reasonable attempt which has been made to address the problems of the U.N. in general and the UN Collective Security System in particular and provide at least a framework and starting point for a coherent “international security strategy” can be found in the Report of the “High-level Panel of Experts on Threats, Challenges and Change” which was drawn up at the request of UN Secretary-General Anan and was transmitted to the U.N. General Assembly for consideration at its annual session in September 2005 as U.N. Doc. A/59/565 of 2 December 2004. The Report addresses the relationship of (anticipatory) self-defense to the U.N. Collective Security System in its Part Three at 53 et seq. While the suggestions made in the Report in relation to this relationship and the parameters of self-defense are not above criticism and were not acted upon by the General Assembly at its annual session in 2005, this does not mean they do not deserve serious consideration. They provide at the least a useful starting point for a debate concerning the role of the UN collective security system and its relationship with self-defense which should be taken up at the earliest possible time.
^78	  See n. 4 and accompanying text supra.
^79	  On the illegality of punitive armed reprisals see inter alia Dinstein, supra n. 4, 215-16 (where he distinguishes between defensive and punitive armed reprisals) and R. Barsotti “Armed Reprisals” in A. Cassese (ed.) The Current Legal Regulation of the Use of Force (1986) 79 et seq. See also the reference to the illegality of (peace time) armed reprisal in UNGA Res. 2625 (xxv) of 1970 “Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (the “Friendly Relations” Declaration). 
^80	  This is the position taken by Dinstein, op. cit. 215 et seq. While his arguments are generally persuasive, there seems to be a certain inconsistency in his support of defensive armed reprisals on the one hand and his rejection of anticipatory action – or at least his restriction of such action to what he refers to as “interceptive” self-defense. If defensive armed reprisals form part of self-defense, this must be so primarily because they are directed towards the prevention of further or recurring attacks at some point in the future. This must, by its nature, include an element of anticipatory self-defense which is not necessarily restricted to the interception of an attack which has been initiated. An example of such an exercise of self-defense which was both partly a defensive armed reprisal and partly an act of anticipatory self-defense was the U.S. and Allied response to the “9-11” attack by means of a counter attack against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan in October 2001, which is referred to in n. 75 supra. It seems to this author that it is more a question of the reasoning and terminology used rather than the conclusions which we reach by different routes which separate our respective positions.
^81	  For the problems relating to evidence of the source of attacks – especially indirect attacks – in the face of denials and related conduct see nn. 28-30 supra. It is submitted that there must be credible and persuasive evidence that a particular attack. This is perhaps even more the case in relation to the exercise of anticipatory self-defense, where the possibility of error (based upon faulty or incomplete information or intelligence) is self-evident. However, this does not signify that the evidence should be held to the same standard as in criminal proceedings. This is not possible, nor would it be reasonable to expect such a high burden of proof in relation to inter-State self-defense. Where a State can make out a “case” based on persuasive evidence which is “highly suggestive” to use the terminology of the ICJ in the Oil Platform case, there is in principle a basis or taking action in self-defense, including anticipatory self-defense. This is a fortiori the case when a State has contributed to a perception on the part of the reacting State that it approves, condones or otherwise threatens the reacting State by its own conduct. In any case, it should be clear that mere denial of responsibility should not be taken at face value any more than mere allegations of responsibility which are unsupported by further evidence should be.
